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Variable mathematical objects


VARIABLE MATHEMATICAL OBJECTS

In many mathematical texts, the variable $x$ may denote a real number, although which real number may not be specified. This is an example of a variable mathematical object. This point of view and terminology is not widespread, but I think it is worth understanding because it provides a deeper understanding of some aspects about how math is done.

Specific and variable mathematical objects


It is useful to distinguish between specific math objects and variable math objects.

Examples of specific math objects

  • The number $42$ (the math object represented as “42” in base $10$, “2A” in hexadecimal and “XLII” as a Roman numeral) is a specific math object. It is an abstract math object. It is not any of the representations just listed — they are just strings of letters and numbers.
  • The ordered pair $(4,3)$ is a specific math object. It is not the same as the ordered pair $(7,-2)$, which is another specific math object.
  • The sine function $\sin:\mathbb{R}\to\mathbb{R}$ is a specific math object. You may know that the sine function is also defined for all complex numbers, which gives another specific math object $\sin:\mathbb{C}\to\mathbb{C}$.
  • The group of symmetries of a square is a specific math object. (If you don’t know much about groups, the link gives a detailed description of this particular group.)

Variable math objects

Math books are full of references to math objects, typically named by a letter or a name, that are not completely specified. Some mathematicians call these variable objects (not standard terminology). The idea of a variable mathe­mati­cal object is not often taught as such in under­graduate classes but it is worth pondering. It has certainly clari­fied my thinking about expres­sions with variables.

Examples

  • If an author or lecturer says “Let $x$ be a real variable”, you can then think of $x$ as a variable real number. In a proof you can’t assume that $x$ is any particular real number such as $42$ or $\pi$.
  • If a lecturer says, “Let $(a,b)$ be an ordered pair of integers”, then all you know is that $a$ and $b$ are integers. This makes $(a,b)$ a variable ordered pair, specifically a pair of integers. The lecturer will not say it is a variable ordered pair since that terminology is not widely used. You have to understand that the phrase “Let $(a,b)$ be an ordered pair of integers” implies that it is a variable ordered pair just because “a” and “b” are letters instead of numbers.
  • If you are going to prove a theorem about functions, you might begin, "Let $f$ be a continuous function", and in the proof refer to $f$ and various objects connected to $f$. This makes $f$ a variable mathematical object. When you are proving things about $f$ you may use the fact that it is continuous. But you cannot assume that it is (for example) the sine function or any other particular function.
  • If someone says, “Let $G$ be a group” you can think of $G$ as a variable group. If you want to prove something about $G$ you are free to use the definition of “group” and any theorems you know of that apply to all groups, but you can’t assume that $G$ is any specific group.

Terminology

A logician would refer to the symbol $f$, thought of as denoting a function, as a vari­able, and likewise the symbol $G$, thought of as denoting a group. But mathe­maticians in general would not use the word “vari­able” in those situa­tions.

How to think about variable objects

The idea that $x$ is a variable object means thinking of $x$ as a genuine mathematical object, but with limitations about what you can say or think about it. Specifically,

Some assertions about a variable math object
may be neither true nor false.

Example

The statement, “Let $x$ be a real number” means that $x$ is to be regarded as a variable real number (usually called a “real variable”). Then you know the following facts:

  • The statement “${{x}^{2}}$ is not negative” is true.
  • The assertion “$x=x+1$” is false.
  • The assertion “$x\gt 0$” is neither true nor false.
Example

Suppose you are told that $x$ is a real number and that ${{x}^{2}}-5x=-6$.

  • You know (because it is given) that the statement “${{x}^{2}}-5x=-6$” is true.
  • By doing some algebra, you can discover that the statement “$x=2$ or $x=3$” is true.
  • The statement “$x=2$ and $x=3$” is false, because $2\neq3$.
  • The statement “$x=2$” is neither true nor false, and similarly for “$x=3$”.
  • This situation could be described this way: $x$ is a variable real number varying over the set $\{2,3\}$.
Example

This example may not be easy to understand. It is intended to raise your consciousness.

A prime pair is an ordered pair of integers $(n,n+2)$ with the property that both $n$ and $n+2$ are prime numbers.

Definition: $S$ is a PP set if $S$ is a set of pairs of integers with the property that every pair is a prime pair.

  • “$\{(3,5),(11,13)\}$ is a PP set” is true.
  • “$\{(5,7),(111,113),(149,151)\}$ is a PP set” is false.

Now suppose $SS$ is a variable PP set.

  • “$SS$ is a set” is true by definition.
  • “$SS$ contains $(7,9)$” is false.
  • “$SS$ contains $(3,5)$” is neither true nor false, as the examples just above show.
  • “$SS$ is an infinite set”:
    • This is certainly not true (see finite examples above).
    • This claim may be neither true nor false, or it may be plain false, because no one knows whether there is an infinite number of prime pairs.
    • The point of this example is to show that “we don’t know” doesn’t mean the same thing as “neither true nor false”.

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Functions: Metaphors, Images and Representations

Please read this post at abstractmath.org. I originally posted the document here but some of the diagrams would not render, and I haven’t been able to figure out why. Sorry for having to redirect.

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Sets

I have been working my way through abstractmath.org, revising the articles and turning them into pure HTML so they will be easier to update. In some cases I am making substantial revisions. In particular, many of the articles need a more modern point of view.

 

The math community’s understanding of sets and structures has changed because of category theory and will change
because of homotopy type theory.

 

This post considers some issues and possibilities concerning the chapter on sets.

The references listed at the end of the article include several about homotopy type theory. They provide different viewpoints and require different levels of sophistication.

A specification of the concept of set

The abmath article Specification of sets specifies what a set is in this way:

A set is a single math object distinct from but completely determined by what its elements are.

I have used this specification for sets since the eighties, first in my Discrete Math lecture notes and then in abstractmath.org. It has proved useful because it is quite simple and the statement implies lots of immediate consequences. Each of the first four consequences in this list below exposes a confusion that some students have.

Consequences of the specification

  1. A set is a math object. It has the same status as the number “$143$” and the sine function and the real line: they are all objects of math. A set is not merely a typographically convenient way to define a certain collection of things.
  2. A set is a single object. Many beginners seem to have in their head that the set $\{3,4\}$ is two things.
  3. A set is distinct from its elements. The set $\{3,4\}$ is not $3$, it is not $4$, it is not a number at all.
  4. The spec implies that $\{3,4\}$ is the same set as $\{4,3\}$. Some students think they understand this but some of their mistakes show that they don’t really understand it.
  5. On the other hand, $\{3,5\}$ is a different set from $\{3,4\}$. I haven’t noticed this bothering students but it bothers me. See the discussion on ursets below.

Those consequences make the spec a useful teaching tool. But if a beginning abstract math student gets very far in their studies, some complications come up.

Defining “set”

In the late nineteenth century, math people started formally defining particular math structures such as groups and various
kinds of spaces. This was normally done by starting with a set and adding structure.

You may think that “starting with a set and adding structure” brushes a lot of complications under the rug. Well, don’t look under the rug, at least not right now.

The way they thought about sets was a informal version of what is now called naive set theory. In particular, they freely defined particular sets using what is essentially setbuilder notation, producing sets in a way which (I claim) satisfies my specification.

Bertrand Russell wakes everyone up

Then along came Russell’s paradox. In the context of this discussion, the paradox implied that the spec for sets is not a definition.The spec provides a set of necessary conditions for being a set. But it is not sufficient. You can say “Let $S$ be the set of all sets that…[satisfy some condition]” until you are blue in the face, but there are conditions (including the empty condition) that don’t define a set.

The Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms

The Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms were designed to provide a definition that didn’t create contradictions. The axioms accomplish this by creating a sort of hierarchy that requires that each set must be defined in terms of sets defined previously. They provide a good way (but not the only one) of providing a way of legitimizing our use of sets in math.

Observe that the “set of all sets” is certainly not “defined” in terms of previously defined sets!

Sets as a foundation

During those days there was a movement to provide a solid foundation for mathematics. After Zermelo-Fraenkel came along, the progress of thinking seemed to be:

  1. Sets are in trouble.
  2. Zermelo-Fraenkel solves our set difficulties.
  3. So let’s require that every math object be a set.

That list is oversimplified. In particular, the development of predicate logic was essential to this approach, but I can’t write about everything at once.

This leads to monsters such as the notorious definition of ordered pair:

The ordered pair $(a,b)$ is the set $\{a,\{b\}\}$.

This leads to the ludicrous statement that $a$ is an element of $(a,b)$ but that $b$ is not.

By saying every math object may be modeled as a set with structure, ZF set theory becomes a model of all of math. This approach gives a useful proof that all of math is as consistent as ZF set theory is.

But many mathematicians jumped to the conclusion that every math object must be a set with structure. This approach does not match the way mathematicians think about math objects. In particular, it makes computerized proof assistance hard to use because you have to translate your thinking into sets and first order logic.

Sets by category theory

“A mathematical object is determined by the role it plays in a category.” — A. Grothendieck

In category theory, you define math structures in terms of how they relate to other math structures. This shifts the emphasis from

What is it?

to

What are its properties?

For example, an ordered pair is a mathematical object $p$ determined by these properties:

  • It determines mathematical objects $p_1$ and $p_2$.
  • $p$ is completely determined by what $p_1$ is and what $p_2$ is.
  • If $p$ and $q$ are ordered pairs and $p_1=q_1$ and $p_2=q_2$ then $p=q$.

Categorical definition of set

“Categorical” here means “as understood in category theory”. It unfortunately has a very different meaning in model theory (set of axioms with only one model up to isomorphism) and in general usage, as in “My answer is categorically NO” said by someone who is red in the face. The word “categorial” has an entirely different meaning in linguistics. *Sigh*.

William Lawvere has produced an axiomatization of the category of sets.
The most accessible introduction to it that I know of is the article Rethinking set theory, by Tom Leinster. This axiomatization defines sets by their relationship with each other and other math objects in much the same way as the categorical definition of (for example) groups gives a definition of groups that works in any category.

“Set” means two different things

The word set as used informally has two different meanings.

  • According to my specification of sets, $\{3,4\}$ is a set and so is $\{3,5\}$.
  • $\{3,4\}$ and $\{3,5\}$ are not the same set because they don’t have the same elements.
  • But in the category of sets, any two $2$-element sets are isomorphic. (So are any two seven element sets.)
  • From a categorical point of view, two isomorphic objects in a category can be be thought of as the same object, with a caveat that you have better make it clear which isomorphism you are thinking of.

One of the great improvements in mathematics that homotopy type theory supplies is a systematic way of keeping track of the isomorphisms, the isomorphisms between the isomorphisms, and so on ad infinitum (literally). But note: I am just beginning to understand htt, so regard this remark as something to be suspicious of.

  • But $\{3,4\}$ and $\{3,5\}$ may not be thought of as the same object according to the spec I gave, because they don’t have the same elements.
  • This means that the traditional idea of set is not the same as the strict categorical idea of set.

I suggest that we keep the word “set” for the traditional concept and call the strict categorical concept an urset.

A traditional set is a structure on an urset

The traditional set $\{3,5\}$ consists of the unique two-element urset coindexed on the integers.

A (ur)set $S$ coindexed by a math structure $A$ is a monic map from $S$ to the underlying set of $A$. In this example, the map has codomain the integers and takes one element of the two-element urset to $3$ and the other to $5$.

Note added 2014-10-05 in response to Toby Bartels’ comment: I am inclined to use the names “abstract set” for “urset” and “concrete set” for coindexed sets when I revise the articles on sets. But most of the time we can get away with just “set”.

There is clearly no isomorphism of coindexed sets from $\{3,4\}$ to $\{3,5\}$, so those two traditional sets are not equal in the category of coindexed sets.

I made up the phrase “coindexed set” to use in this sense, since it is a kind of opposite of indexed set. If terminology for this already exists, lemme know. Linguists will tell you they use the word “coindexed” in a different sense.

Elements

The concept of “element” in categorical thinking is very different from the traditional idea, where an element of a set can be any mathematical object. In categorical thinking, an element of an object $A$ of a category $\mathbf{C}$ is an arrow $1\to A$ where $1$ is the terminal object. Thus $4$ as an integer is the arrow $1\to \mathbb{Z}$ whose unique value is the number $4$.

An object is an element of only one set

In the usage of category theory, the arrow $1\to\mathbb{R}$ whose value is the real number $4$ is a different math object from the arrow $1\to\mathbb{Z}$ whose value is the integer $4$.

A category theorist will probably agree that we can identify the integer $4$ with the real number $4$ via the well known canonical embedding of the ring of integers into the field of real numbers. But in categorical thinking you have to keep all such embeddings in mind; you don’t say the integer $4$ is the same thing as the real number $4$. (Most computer languages keep them distinct, too.)

This difference is actually not hard to get used to and is in fact an improvement over traditional set theory. When you do category theory you use lots of commutative diagrams. The embeddings show up as monic arrows and are essential in keeping the different objects ($\mathbb{Z}$ and $\mathbb{R}$ in the example) separate.

The paper Relating first-order set theory and elementary toposes, by Awodey, Butz, Simpson and Streicher, introduces a concept of “structural system of inclusions” that appears to me to restore the idea of object being an element of more than one set for many purposes.

Homotopy type theory allows an object to have only one type, with much the same effect as in the categorical approach.

Variable elements

The arrow $1\to \mathbb{Z}$ that picks out the integer $4$ is a constant function. It is useful to think of any arrow $A\to B$ of any category as a variable element (or generalized element) of the object $B$. For example, the function $f:\mathbb{R}\to \mathbb{R}$ defined by $f(x)=x^2$ allows you to
think of $x^2$ as a variable number with real parameter. This is another way of thinking about the “$y$” in the equation $y=x^2$, which is commonly called a dependent variable.

One way to think about $y$ is that some statements about it are true, some are false, and many statements are neither true nor false.

  • $y\geq 0$ is true.
  • $y\lt0$ is false.
  • $y\leq1$ is neither true nor false.

This way of thinking about variable objects clears up a lot of confusion about variables and deserves to be more widely used in teaching.

The book Category theory for computing science provides some examples of the use of variable elements as a way of thinking about categorical ideas.

References

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Images and metaphors in math

About this post

This post is the new revision of the chapter on Images and Metaphors in abstractmath.org.

Images and metaphors in math

In this chapter, I say something about mental represen­tations (metaphors and images) in general, and provide examples of how metaphors and images help us understand math – and how they can confuse us.

Pay special attention to the section called two levels!  The distinction made there is vital but is often not made explicit.

Besides mental represen­tations, there are other kinds of represen­tations used in math, discussed in the chapter on represen­tations and models.

Mathe­matics is the tinkertoy of metaphor. –Ellis D. Cooper

Images and metaphors in general

We think and talk about our experiences of the world in terms of images and metaphors that are ultimately derived from immediate physical experience.  They are mental represen­tations of our experiences.

See Thinking about thought.

Examples

Images

We know what a pyramid looks like.  But when we refer to the government’s food pyramid we are not talking about actual food piled up to make a pyramid.  We are talking about a visual image of the pyramid.    

Metaphors

We know by direct physical experience what it means to be warm or cold.  We use these words as metaphors
in many ways: 

  • We refer to a person as having a warm or cold personality.  This has nothing to do with their body temperature.
  • When someone is on a treasure hunt we may tell them they are “getting warm”, even if they are hunting outside in the snow.

Children don’t always sort meta­phors out correctly. Father: “We are all going to fly to Saint Paul to see your cousin Petunia.” Child: “But Dad, I don’t know how to fly!”

Other terminology

  • My use of the word “image” means mental image. In the study of literature, the word “image” is used in a more general way, to refer to an expression that evokes a mental image..
  • I use “metaphor” in the sense of conceptual metaphor. The word metaphor in literary studies is related to my use but is defined in terms of how it is expressed.
  • The metaphors mentioned above involving “warm” and “cold”
    evoke a sensory experience, and so could be called an image as well. 
  • In math education, the phrase concept image means the mental structure associated with a concept, so there may be no direct connection with sensory experience.  
  • In abstractmath.org, I use the phrase metaphors and images to talk about all our mental represen­tations, without trying for fine distinctions.

Mental represen­tations are imperfect

One basic fact about metaphors and images is that they apply only to certain aspects of the situation.

  • When someone is getting physically warm we would expect them to start sweating.
  • But if they are getting warm in a treasure hunt we don’t expect them to start sweating. 
  • We don’t expect the food pyramid to have a pharaoh buried underneath it, either.

Our brains handle these aspects of mental represen­tations easily and usually without our being conscious of them.  They are one of the primary ways we understand the world.

Images and metaphors in math

Half this game is 90% mental. –Yogi Berra

Types of represen­tations

Mathe­maticians who work with a particular kind of mathe­matical object
have mental represen­tations of that type of object that help them
understand it.  These mental represen­tations come in many forms.  Most of them fit into one of the types below, but the list shouldn’t be taken too seriously: Some represen­tations fit more that of these types, and some may not fit into any of them except awkwardly.

  • Visual
  • Notation
  • Kinetic
  • Process
  • Object

All mental represen­tations are conceptual metaphors. Metaphors are treated in detail in this chapter and in the chapter on images and metaphors for functions.  See also literalism and Proofs without dry bones on Gyre&Gimble.

Below I list some examples. Many of them refer to the arch function, the function defined by $h(t)=25-{{(t-5)}^{2}}$.

Visual image

Geometric figures



The arch function

  • You can picture the arch function in terms of its graph, which is a parabola.     This visualization suggests that the function has a single maximum point that appears to occur at $t=5$. That is an example of how metaphors can suggest (but not prove) theorems.
  • You can think of the arch function
    more physically, as like the Gateway Arch. This metaphor is suggested by the graph.

Interior of a shape

  • The interior of a closed curve or a sphere is called that because it is like the interior in the everyday sense of a bucket or a house.
  • Sometimes, the interior can be described using analytic geometry. For example, the interior of the circle $x^2+y^2=1$ is the set of points \[\{(x,y)|x^2+y^2\lt1\}\]
  • But the “interior” metaphor is imperfect: The boundary of a real-life container such as a bucket has thickness, in contrast to the boundary of a closed curve or a sphere. 
  • This observation illustrates my description of a metaphor as identifying part of one situation with part of another. One aspect is emphasized; another aspect, where they may differ, is ignored.

Real number line

  • You may think of the real
    numbers
    as lying along a straight line (the real line) that extends infinitely far in both directions.  This is both visual and a metaphor (a real number “is” a place on the real line).
  • This metaphor is imperfect because you can’t draw the whole real line, but only part of it. But you can’t draw the whole graph of the curve $y=25-(t-5)^2$, either.

Continuous functions

No gaps

“Continuous functions don’t have gaps in the graph”.    This is a visual image, and it is usually OK.

  • But consider the curve defined by $y=25-(t-5)^2$ for every real $x$ except $x=1$. It is not defined at $x=1$ (and so the function is discontinuous there) but its graph looks exactly like the graph in the figure above because no matter how much you magnify it you can’t see the gap.
  • This is a typi­cal math example that teachers make up to raise your consciousness.

  • So is there a gap or not?
No lifting

“Continuous functions can be drawn without lifting the chalk.” This is true in most familiar cases (provided you draw the graph only on a finite interval). But consider the graph of the function defined by $f(0)=0$ and \[f(t)=t\sin\frac{1}{t}\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ (0\lt t\lt 0.16)\]
(see Split Definition). This curve is continuous and is infinitely long even though it is defined on a finite interval, so you can’t draw it with a chalk at all, picking up the chalk or not. Note that it has no gaps.

Keeping concepts separate by using mental “space”

I personally use visual images to remember relationships between abstract objects, as well.  For example, if I think of three groups, two of which are isomorphic (for example $\mathbb{Z}_{3}$ and $\text{Alt}_3$), I picture them as in three different places in my head with a connection between the two isomorphic ones.

Notation

Here I give some examples of thinking of math objects in terms of the notation used to name them. There is much more about notation as mathe­matical represen­tation in these sections of abmath:

Notation is both something you visualize in your head and also a physical represen­tation of the object.  In fact notation can also be thought of as a mathe­matical object in itself (common in mathe­matical logic and in theoretical computing science.)   If you think about what notation “really is” a lot,  you can easily get a headache…

Symbols

  • When I think of the square root of $2$, I visualize the symbol “$\sqrt{2}$”. That is both a typographical object and a mathe­matically defined symbolic represen­tation of the square root of $2$.
  • Another symbolic represen­tation of the square root of $2$ is “$2^{1/2}$”. I personally don’t visualize that when I think of the square root of $2$, but there is nothing wrong with visualizing it that way.
  • What is dangerous is thinking that the square root of $2$ is the symbol “$\sqrt{2}$” (or “$2^{1/2}$” for that matter). The square root of $2$ is an abstract mathe­matical object given by a precise mathe­matical definition.
  • One precise defi­nition of the square root of $2$ is “the positive real number $x$ for which $x^2=2$”. Another definition is that $\sqrt{2}=\frac{1}{2}\log2$.

Integers

  • If I mention the number “two thousand, six hundred forty six” you may visualize it as “$2646$”. That is its decimal represen­tation.
  • But $2646$ also has a prime factorization, namely $2\times3^3\times7^2$.
  • It is wrong to think of this number as being the notation “$2646$”. Different notations have different values, and there is no mathe­matical reason to make “$2646$” the “genuine” represen­tation. See represen­tations and Models.
  • For example, the prime factor­ization of $2646$ tells you imme­diately that it is divisible by $49$.

When I was in high school in the 1950’s, I was taught that it was incorrect to say “two thousand, six hundred and forty six”. Being naturally rebellious I used that extra “and” in the early 1960’s in dictating some number in a telegraph mes­sage. The Western Union operator corrected me. Of course, the “and” added to the cost. (In case you are wondering, I was in the middle of a postal Diplomacy game in Graustark.)

Formulas

Set notation

You can think of the set containing $1$, $3$ and $5$ and nothing else as represented by its common list notation $\{1, 3, 5\}$.  But remember that $\{5, 1,3\}$ is another notation for the same set. In other words the list notation has irrelevant features – the order in which the elements are listed in this case.


Kinetic

Shoot a ball straight up

  • The arch function could model the height over time of a physical object, perhaps a ball shot vertically upwards on a planet with no atmosphere.
  • The ball starts upward at time $t=0$ at elevation $0$, reaches an elevation of (for example) $16$ units at time $t=2$, and lands at $t=10$.
  • The parabola is not the path of the ball. The ball goes up and down along the $x$-axis. A point on the parabola shows it locaion on the $x$ axis at time $t$.
  • When you think about this event, you may imagine a physical event continuing over time, not just as a picture but as a feeling of going up and down.
  • This feeling of the ball going up and down is created in your mind presumably using mirror neuron. It is connected in your mind by a physical connection to the understanding of the function that has been created as connections among some of your neurons.
  • Although $h(t)$ models the height of the ball, it is not the same thing as the height of the ball.  A mathe­matical object may have a relationship in our mind to physical processes or situations, but it is distinct from them.

Remarks

  1. This example involves a picture (graph of a function).  According to this report, kinetic
    understanding can also help with learning math that does not involve pictures. 
    For example, when I think of evaluating the function ${{x}^{2}}+1$ at 3, I visualize
    3 moving into the x slot and then the formula $9^2+1$ transforming
    itself into $10$. (Not all mathematicians visualize it this way.)
  2. I make the point of emphasizing the physical existence in your brain of kinetic feelings (and all other metaphors and images) to make it clear that this whole section on images and metaphors is about objects that have a physical existence; they are not abstract ideals in some imaginary ideal space not in our world. See Thinking about thought.

I remember visualizing algebra I this way even before I had ever heard of the Transformers.

Process 

It is common to think of a function as a process: you put in a number (or other object) and the process produces another number or other object. There are examples in Images and metaphors for functions.

Long division

Let’s divide $66$ by $7$ using long division. The process consists of writing down the decimal places one by one.

  1. You guess at or count on your fingers to find the largest integer $n$ for which $7n\lt66$. That integer is $9$.
  2. Write down $9.$ ($9$ followed by a decimal point).
  3. $66-9\times7=3$, so find the largest integer $n$ for which $7n\lt3\times10$, which is $4$.
  4. Adjoin $4$ to your answer, getting $9.4$
  5. $3\times10-7\times4=2$, so find the largest integer $n$ for which $7n\lt2\times10$, which is $2$.
  6. Adjoin $2$ to your answer, getting $9.42$.
  7. $2\times10-7\times2=6$, so find the largest integer for which $7n\lt6\times10$, which is $8$.
  8. Adjoin $8$ to your answer, getting $9.428$.
  9. $6\times10-7\times8=4$, so find the largest integer for which $7n\lt4\times10$, which is $5$.
  10. Adjoin $5$ to your answer, getting $9.4285$.

You can continue with the procedure to get as many decimal places as you wish of $\frac{66}{7}$.

Remark

The sequence of actions just listed is quite difficult to follow. What is difficult is not understanding what they say to do, but where did they get the numbers? So do this exercise!

Exercise worth doing:

Check that the procedure above is exactly what you do to divide $66$ by $7$ by the usual method taught in grammar school:




Remarks
  • The long division process produces as many decimal places as you have stamina for. It is likely for most readers that when you do long division by hand you have done it so much that you know what to do next without having to consult a list of instructions.
  • It is a process or procedure but not what you might want to call a function. The process recursively constructs the successive integers occurring in the decimal expansion of $\frac{66}{7}$.
  • When you carry out the grammar school procedure above, you know at each step what to do next. That is why is it a process. But do you have the procedure in your head all at once?
  • Well, instructions (5) through (10) could be written in a programming language as a while loop, grouping the instructions in pairs of commands ((5) and (6), (7) and (8), and so on). However many times you go through the while loop determines the number of decimal places you get.
  • It can also be described as a formally defined recursive function $F$ for which $F(n)$ is the $n$th digit in the answer.
  • Each of the program and the recursive definition mentioned in the last two bullets are exercises worth doing.
  • Each of the answers to the exercises is then a mathematical object, and that brings us to the next type of metaphor…

Object

A particular kind of metaphor or image for a mathematical concept is that of a mathematical object that represents the concept.

Examples

  • The number $10$ is a mathematical object. The expression “$3^2+1$” is also a mathematical object. It encapsulates the process of squaring $3$ and adding $1$, and so its value is $10$.
  • The long division process above finds the successive decimal places of a fraction of integers. A program that carries out the algorithm encapsulates the process of long division as an algorithm. The result is a mathematical object.
  • The expression “$1958$” is a mathematical object, namely the decimal represen­tation of the number $1958$. The expression
    “$7A6$” is the hexadecimal represen­tation of $1958$. Both represen­tations are mathematical objects with precise definitions.

Represen­tations as math objects is discussed primarily in represen­tations and Models. The difference between represen­tations as math objects and other kinds of mental represen­tations (images and metaphors) is primarily that a math object has a precise mathematical definition. Even so, they are also mental represen­tations.

Uses of mental represen­tations

Mental represen­tations of a concept make up what is arguably the most important part of the mathe­matician’s understanding of the concept.

  • Mental represen­tations of mathe­matical objects using metaphors and images are necessary for understanding and communicating about them (especially with types of objects that are new to us) .
  • They are necessary for seeing how the theory can be applied.
  • They are useful for coming up with proofs. (See example below.) 

Many represen­tations

 Different mental represen­tations of the same kind of object
help you understand different aspects of the object. 

Every important mathe­matical object
has many different kinds of represen­tations
and mathe­maticians typically keep
more that one of them in mind at once.

But images and metaphors are also dangerous (see below).

New concepts and old ones

We especially depend on metaphors and images to understand a math concept that is new to us .  But if we work with it for awhile, finding lots of examples, and
eventually proving theorems and providing counterexamples to conjectures, we begin to understand the concept in its own terms and the images and metaphors tend to fade away from our awareness.

Then, when someone asks us about this concept that we are now experts with, we
trundle out our old images and metaphors – and are often surprised at how difficult and misleading our listener finds them!

Some mathe­maticians retreat from images and metaphors because of this and refuse to do more than state the definition and some theorems about the concept. They are wrong to do this. That behavior encourages the attitude of many people that

  • Mathe­maticians can’t explain things.
  • Math concepts are incomprehensible or bizarre.
  • You have to have a mathe­matical mind to understand math.

In my opinion the third statement is only about 10 percent true.

All three of these statements are half-truths. There is no doubt that a lot of abstract math is hard to understand, but understanding is certainly made easier with the use of images and metaphors. 

Images and metaphors on this website

This website has many examples of useful mental represen­tations.  Usually, when a chapter discusses a particular type of mathe­matical object, say rational numbers, there will be a subhead entitled “Images and metaphors for rational numbers”.  This will suggest ways of thinking about them that many have found useful. 

Two levels of images and metaphors

Images and metaphors have to be used at two different levels, depending on your purpose. 

  • You should expect to use rich view for understanding, applications, and coming up with proofs.
  • You must limit yourself to the rigorous view when constructing and checking proofs.

Math teachers and texts typically do not make an explicit distinction between these views, and you have to learn about it by osmosis. In practice, teachers and texts do make the distinction implicitly.  They will say things
like, “You can think about this theorem as …” and later saying, “Now we give a rigorous proof of the theorem.”  Abstractmath.org makes this distinction explicit in many places throughout the site.

The
rich view

The kind of metaphors and images discussed in the mental represen­tations section above make math rich, colorful and intriguing to think about.  This is the rich view of math.  The rich view is vitally important.  

  • It is what makes math useful and interesting.
  • It helps us to understand the math we are working with.
  • It suggests applications.
  • It suggests approaches to proofs.
Example

You expect the ball whose trajectory is modeled by the function h(t) above  to slow down as it rises, so the derivative of h must be smaller at t
= 4
 than it is at t = 2.  A mathe­matician might even say that that is an “informal proof” that $h'(4)<h'(2)$.  A rigorous proof is given below.

The rigorous view: inertness

When we are constructing a definition or proof we cannot
trust all those wonderful images and metaphors. 

  • Definitions must
    not use metaphors.
  • Proofs must use only logical reasoning based on definitions and
    previously proved theorems.

For the point of view of doing proofs, math
objects must be thought of as inert (or static),
like your pet rock. This means they

  • don’t move or change over time, and
  • don’t interact with other objects, even other mathe­matical objects.

(See also abstract object).

  • When
    mathe­maticians say things like, “Now we give a rigorous proof…”, part of what they mean is that they have to forget about all the color
    and excitement of the rich view and think of math objects as totally
    inert. Like, put the object under an anesthetic
    when you are proving something about it.
  • As I wrote previously, when you are trying to understand arch function $h(t)=25-{{(t-5)}^{2}}$, it helps to think of it as representing a ball thrown directly upward, or as a graph describing the height of the ball at time $t$ which bends over like an arch at the time when the ball stops going upward and begins to fall down.
  • When you proving something about it, you must be in the frame of mind that says the function (or the graph) is all laid out in front of you, unmoving. That is what the rigorous mode requires. Note that the rigorous mode is a way of thinking, not a claim about what the arch function “really is”.
  • When in rigorous mode,  a mathe­matician will
    think of $h$ as a complete mathe­matical object all at once,
    not changing over time. The
    function is the total relationship of the input values of the input parameter
    $t$ to the output values $h(t)$.  It consists of a bunch of interrelated information, but it doesn’t do anything and it doesn’t change.

Formal proof that $h'(4)<h'(2)$

Above, I gave an informal argument for this.   The rigorous way to see that $h'(4)\lt h'(2)$ for the arch function is to calculate the derivative \[h'(t)=10-2t\] and plug in 4 and 2 to get \[h'(4)=10-8=2\] which is less than $h'(2)=10-4=6$.

Note the embedded
phrases
.

This argument picks out particular data about the function that
prove the statement.  It says nothing about anything slowing down as $t$
increases.  It says nothing about anything at all changing.

Other examples

  • The rigorous way to say that “Integers go to infinity in both directions” is something like this:  “For every integer n there is an integer k such that k < n  and an integer m such that n < m.”
  • The rigorous way to say that continuous functions don’t have gaps in their graph is to use the $\varepsilon-\delta $ definition of continuity.
  • Conditional assertions are one important aspect of mathe­matical reasoning in which this concept of unchanging inertness clears up a lot of misunderstanding.   “If… then…” in our intuition contains an idea of causation and of one thing happening before another (see also here).  But if objects are inert they don’t cause anything and if they are unchanging then “when” is meaningless.

The rigorous view does not apply to all abstract objects, but only to mathe­matical objects.  See abstract objects for examples.

Metaphors and images are dangerous

The price of metaphor is eternal vigilance.–Norbert Wiener

Every
mental represen­tation has flaws. Each oneprovides a way of thinking about an $A$ as a kind of $B$ in some respects. But the represen­tation can have irrelevant features.  People new to the subject will be tempted to think  about $A$ as a kind of $B$ in inappropriate respects as well.  This is a form of cognitive dissonance.

 It may be that most difficulties students have with abstract math are based on not knowing which aspects of a given represen­tation are applicable in a given situation.  Indeed, on not being consciously aware that in general you must restrict the applicability of the mental pictures that come with a represen­tation.

In abstractmath.org you will sometimes see this statement:  “What is wrong with this metaphor:”  (or image, or represen­tation) to warn you about the flaws of that particular represen­tation.

Example

The graph of the arch function $h(t)$ makes it look like the two arms going downward become so nearly vertical that the curve has vertical asymptotes
But it does not have asymptotes.  The arms going down are underneath every point of the $x$-axis. For example, there is a point on the curve underneath the point $(999,0)$, namely $(999, -988011)$.

Example

A set is sometimes described as analogous to A container. But consider:  the integer 3 is “in” the set of all odd integers, and it is also “in” the set $\left\{ 1,\,2,\,3 \right\}$.  How could something be in two containers at once?  (More about this here.)

An analogy can be help­ful, but it isn’t the same thing as the same thing. – The Economist

Example

Mathe­maticians think of the real numbers as constituting a line infinitely long in both directions, with each number as a point on the line. But this does not mean that you can think of the line as a row of points. See density of the real line.

Example

We commonly think of functions as machines that turn one number into another.  But this does not mean that, given any such function, we can construct a machine (or a program) that can calculate it.  For many functions, it is not only impractical to do, it is theoretically
impossible to do it.
They are not href=”http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recursive_function_theory#Turing_computability”>computable. In other words, the machine picture of a function does not apply to all functions.

Summary

The images and metaphors you use
to think about a mathe­matical object
are limited in how they apply.

The images and metaphors you use to think about the subject
cannot be directly used in a proof.
Only definitions and previously proved theorems can be used in a proof.

Final remarks

Mental represen­tations are physical represen­tations

It seems likely that cognitive phenomena such as images and metaphors are physically represented in the brain as collec­tions of neurons connected in specific ways.  Research on this topic is pro­ceeding rapidly.  Perhaps someday we will learn things about how we think physi­cally that actually help us learn things about math.

In any case, thinking about mathe­matical objects as physi­cally represented in your brain (not neces­sarily completely or correctly!) wipes out a lot of the dualistic talk about ideas and physical objects as
separate kinds of things.  Ideas, in partic­ular math objects, are emergent constructs in the
physical brain. 

About metaphors

The language that nature speaks is mathe­matics. The language that ordinary human beings speak is metaphor. Freeman Dyson

“Metaphor” is used in abstractmath.org to describe a type of thought configuration.  It is an implicit conceptual identification
of part of one type of situation with part of another. 

Metaphors are a fundamental way we understand the world. In particular,they are a fundamental way we understand math.

The word “metaphor”

The word “metaphor” is also used in rhetoric as the name of a type of figure of speech.  Authors often refer to metaphor in the meaning of  thought configuration as a conceptual metaphor.  Other figures of speech, such as simile and synecdoche, correspond to conceptual metaphors as well.

References for metaphors in general cognition:

Fauconnier, G. and Turner, M., The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending And The Mind’s Hidden Complexities . Basic Books, 2008.

Lakoff, G., Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. The University of Chicago Press, 1986.

Lakoff, G. and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By
The University of Chicago Press, 1980.

References for metaphors and images in math:

Byers, W., How mathe­maticians Think.  Princeton University Press, 2007.

Lakoff, G. and R. E. Núñez, Where mathe­matics Comes
From
. Basic Books, 2000.

Math Stack Exchange list of explanatory images in math.

Núñez, R. E., “Do Real Numbers Really Move?”  Chapter
in 18 Unconventional Essays on the Nature of mathe­matics, Reuben Hersh,
Ed. Springer, 2006.

Charles Wells,
Handbook of mathe­matical Discourse.

Charles Wells, Conceptual blending. Post in Gyre&Gimble.

Other articles in abstractmath.org

Conceptual and computational

Functions: images and metaphors

Real numbers: images and metaphors

represen­tations and models

Sets: metaphors and images

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Thinking about thought

Modules of the brain

Cognitive neuroscientists have taken the point of view that concepts, memories, words, and so on are represented in the brain by physical systems: perhaps they are individual neurons, or systems of structures, or even waves of discharges. In my previous writing I have referred to these as modules, and I will do that here. Each module is connected to many other modules that encode various properties of the concept, thoughts and memories that occur when you think of that concept (in other words stimulate the module), and so on.

How these modules implement the way we think and perceive the world is not well understood and forms a major research task of cognitive neuroscience. The fact that they are implemented in physical systems in the brain gives us a new way of thinking about thought and perception.

Examples

The grandmother module

There is a module in your brain representing the concept of grandmother. It is likely to be connected to other modules representing your actual grandmothers if you have any memory of them. These modules are connected to many others — memories (if you knew them), other relatives related to them, incidents in their lives that you were told about, and so on. Even if you don’t have any memory of them, you have a module representing the fact that you don’t have any memory of them, and maybe modules explaining why you don’t.

Each different aspect related to “grandmother” belongs to a separate module somehow connected to the grandmother module. That may be hard to believe, but the human brain has over eighty billion neurons.

A particular module connected with math

There is a module in your brain connected with the number $42$. That module has many connections to things you know about it, such as its factorization, the fact that it is an integer, and so on. The module may also have connections to a module concerning the attitude that $42$ is the Answer. If it does, that module may have a connection with the module representing Douglas Adams. He was physically outside your body, but is the number $42$ outside your body?

That has a decidedly complicated answer. The number $42$ exists in a network of brains which communicate with each other and share some ideas about properties of $42$. So it exists socially. This social existence occasionally changes your knowledge of the properties of $42$ and in particular may make you realize that you were wrong about some of its aspects. (Perhaps you once thought it was $7\times 8$.)

This example suggests how I have been using the module idea to explain how we think about math.

A new metaphor for understanding thinking

I am proposing to use the idea of module as a metaphor for thinking about thinking. I believe that it clarifies a lot of the confusion people have about the relation between thinking and the real world. In particular it clarifies why we think of mathematical objects as if they were real-world objects (see Modules and math below.)

I am explicitly proposing this metaphor as a successor to previous metaphors drawn from science to explain things. For example when machines became useful in the 18th century many naturalists used metaphors such as the Universe is a Machine or the Body is a Machine as a way of understanding the world. In the 20th century we fell heavily for the metaphor that the Mind Is A Computer (or Program). Both the 18th century and the 20th century metaphors (in my opinion) improved our understanding of things, even though they both fell short in many ways.

In no way am I claiming that the ways of thinking I am pushing have anything but a rough resemblance to current neuroscientists’ thinking. Even so, further discoveries in neuroscience may give us even more insight into thinking that they do now. Unless at some point something goes awry and we have to, ahem, think differently again.

For thousands of years, new scientific theories have been giving us new metaphors for thinking about life, the universe and everything. I am saying here is a new apple on the tree of knowledge; let’s eat it.

The rest of this post elaborates my proposed metaphor. Like any metaphor, it gets some things right and some wrong, and my explanations of how it works are no doubt full of errors and dubious ideas. Nevertheless, I think it is worth thinking about thought using these ideas with the usual correction process that happens in society with new metaphors.

Our theory of the world

We don’t have any direct perception of the “real world”; we have only the sensations we get from those parts of our body which sense things in the world. These sensations are organized by our brain into a theory of the world.

  • The theory of the world says that the world is “out there” and that our sensory units give us information about it. We are directly aware of our experiences because they are a function of our brain. That the experiences (many of them) originate from outside our body is a very plausible theory generated by our brain on the bases of these experience.
  • The theory is generated by our brain in a way that we cannot observe and is out of our control (mostly). We see a table and we know we can see in in daytime but not when it is dark and we can bump into it, which causes experiences to occur via our touch and sound facilities. But the concept of “table” and the fact that we decide something is or is not a table takes place in our brain, not “out there”.
  • We do make some conscious amendments to the theory. For example, we “know” the sky is not a blue shell around our world, although it looks like it. That we think of the apparent blue surface as an artifact of our vision processing comes about through conscious reasoning. But most of how we understand the world comes about subconsciously.
  • Our brain (and the rest of our body) does an enormous amount of processing to create the view of the world that we have. Visual perception requires a huge amount of processing in our brain and the other sensory methods we use also undergo a lot of processing, but not as much as vision.
  • The theory of the world organizes a lot of what we experience as interaction with physical objects. We perceive physical objects as having properties such as persistence, changing with time, and so on. Our brains create the concept of physical object and the properties of persistence, changing, and particular properties an individual object might have.
  • We think of the Mississippi River as an object that is many years old even though none of its current molecules are the same as were in the river a decade ago. How is it one thing when its substance is constantly changing? This is a famous and ancient conundrum which becomes a non-problem if you realize that the “object” is created inside your brain and imposed by your thinking on your understanding of the world.
  • The notion that semantics is a connection between our brain and the outside world has also become a philosophical conundrum that vanishes if we understand that the connection with the outside world exists entirely inside our theory, which is entirely within our brain.

Society

Our brain also has a theory of society We are immersed in a world of people, that we have close connections with some of them and more distant connections with many other via speech, stories, reading and various kinds of long-distance communications.

  • We associate with individual people, in our family and with our friend. The communication is not just through speech: it involves vision heavily (seeing what The Other is thinking) and probably through pheromones, among other channels. For one perspective on vision, see The vision revolution, by Mark Changizi. (Review)
  • We consciously and unconsciously absorb ideas and attitudes (cultural and otherwise) from the people around us, especially including the adults and children we grow up with. In this way we are heavily embedded in the social world, which creates our point of view and attitudes by our observation and experience and presumably via memes. An example is the widespread recent changes in attitudes in the USA concerning gay marriage.
  • The theory of society seems to me to be a mechanism in our brain that is separate from our theory of the physical world, but which interacts with it. But it may be that it is better to regard the two theories as modules in one big theory.

Modules and math

The module associated with a math object is connected to many other modules, some of which have nothing to do with math.

  • For example, they may have have connections to our sensory organs. We may get a physical feeling that the parabola $y=x^2$ is going “up” as $x$ “moves to the right”. The mirror neurons in our brain that “feel” this are connected to our “parabola $y=x^2$” module. (See Constructivism and Platonism and the posts it links to.)
  • I tend to think of math objects as “things”. Every time I investigate the number $111$, it turns out to be $3\times37$. Every time I investigate the alternating group on $6$ letters it is simple. If I prove a new theorem it feels as if I have discovered the theorem. So math objects are out there and persistent.
  • If some math calculation does not give the same answer the second time I frequently find that I made a mistake. So math facts are consistent.
  • There is presumably a module that recognizes that something is “out there” when I have repeatable and consistent experiences with it. The feeling originates in a brain arranged to detect consistent behavior. The feeling is not evidence that math objects exist in some ideal space. In this way, my proposed new way of thinking about thought abolishes all the problems with Platonism.
  • If I think of two groups that are isomorphic (for example the cyclic group of order $3$ and the alternating group of rank $3$), I picture them as in two different places with a connection between the two isomorphic ones. This phenomenon is presumably connected with modules that respond to seeing physical objects and carrying with them a sense of where they are (two different places). This is a strategy my brain uses to think about objects without having to name them, using the mechanism already built in to think about two things in different places.

Acknowledgments

Many of the ideas in this post come from my previous writing, listed in the references. This post was also inspired by ideas from Chomsky, Jackendoff (particularly Chapter 9), the Scientific American article Brain cells for Grandmother by Quian Quiroga, Fried and Koch, and the papers by Ernest and Hersh.

References

Previous posts

In reverse chronological order

Abstractmath articles

Other sources

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A mathematical saga

This post outlines some of the intellectual developments in the history of math. I call it a saga because it is like one:

  • It is episodic, telling one story after another.
  • It does not try to give an accurate history, but its episodes resemble what happened in math in the last 3000 years.
  • It tells about only a few of the things that happened.

Early techniques

We represented numbers by symbols.

Thousands of years ago, we figured out how to write down words and phrases in such a way that someone much later could read and understand them.

Naturally, we wanted to keep records of the number of horses the Queen owned, so we came up with various notations for numbers (number representing count). In some societies, these symbols were separate from the symbols used to represent words.

We invented algorithms

We discovered positional notation. We write $213$, which is based on a system: it means $2\times100+1\times10+3\times 1$. This notation encapsulates a particular computation of a number (its base-10 representation). (The expression $190+23$ is another piece of notation that encapsulates a computation that yields $213$.)

Compare that to the Roman notation $CCXIII$, which is an only partly organized jumble.
Try adding $CCXIII+CDXXIX$. (The answer is $DCXLII$.)

Positional notation allowed us to create the straightforward method of addition involving adding single digits and carrying:
\[\overset{\hspace{6pt}1\phantom{1}}
{\frac
{\overset{\displaystyle{213}}{429}}{642}
}
\]
Measuring land requires multiplication, which positional notation also allows us to perform easily.
The invention of such algorithms (methodically manipulating symbols) made it easy to calculate with numbers.

Geometry: Direct construction of mathematical objects

We discovered geometry in ancient times, in laying out plots of land and designing buildings. We had a bunch of names for different shapes and for some of them we knew how to calculate their area, perimeter and other things.

Euclid showed how to construct new geometric figures from given ones using specific methods (ruler and compasses) that preserve some properties.

Example

We can bisect a line segment (black) by drawing two circles (blue) centered at the endpoints with radius the length of the line segment. We then construct a line segment (red) between the points of intersection of the circle that intersects the given line segment at its midpoint. These constructions can be thought of as algorithms creating and acting on geometric figures rather than on symbols.



It is true that diagrams were drawn to represent line segments, triangles and so on.
But the diagrams are visualization helpers. The way we think about the process is that we are operating directly on the geometric objects to create new ones. We are thinking of the objects Platonically, although we don’t have to share Plato’s exact concept of their reality. It is enough to say we are thinking about the objects as if they were real.

Axioms and theorems

Euclid came up with the idea that we should write down axioms that are true of these figures and constructions, so that we can systematically use the constructions
to prove theorems about figures using axioms and previously proved theorems. This provided documented reasoning (in natural language, not in symbols) for building up a collection of true statements about math objects.

Example

After creating some tools for proving triangles are congruent, we can prove the the intersection of red and black lines in the figure really is the midpoint of the black line by constructing the four green line segments below and making appeals to congruences between the triangles that show up:



Note that the green lines have the same length as the black line.

Euclid thought about axioms and theorems as applying to geometry, but he also proved theorems about numbers by representing them as ratios of line segments.

Algebra

People in ancient India and Greece knew how to solve linear and quadratic equations using verbal descriptions of what you should do.
Later, we started using a symbolic language to express numerical problems and symbolic manipulation to solve (some of) them.

Example

The quadratic formula is an encapsulated computation that provides the roots of a quadratic equation. Newton’s method is a procedure for finding a root of an arbitrary polynomial. It is recursive in the loose sense (it does not always give an answer).

The symbolic language is a vast expansion of the symbolic notation for numbers. A major innovations was to introduce variables to represent unknowns and to state equations that are always true.

Logic

Aristotle developed an early form of logic (syllogisms) aimed at determining which arguments in rhetoric were sound. “All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is mortal.” This was written in sentences, not in symbols.

By explicit analogy with algebra, we introduced symbolism and manipulation rules for logical reasoning, with an eye toward making mathematical reasoning sound and to some extent computable. For example, in one dialect of logical notation, modus ponens (used in the Socrates syllogism) is expressed as $(P\rightarrow Q,\,P)\,\,\vdash\,\, Q$. This formula is an encapsulated algorithm: it says that if you know $P\rightarrow Q$ and $P$ are valid (are theorems) then $Q$ is valid as well.

Crises of understanding

We struggled with the notion of function as a result of dealing with infinite series. For example, the limit of a sequence of algebraic expressions may not be an algebraic expression. It would no longer do to think of a function as the same thing as an algebraic expression.

We realized that Euclid’s axioms for geometry lacked clarity. For example, as I understand it, the original version of his axioms didn’t imply that the two circles in the proof above had to intersect each other. There were other more subtle problems. Hilbert made a big effort to spell out the axioms in more detail.

We refined our understanding of logic by trying to deal with the mysteries of calculus, limits and spaces. An example is the difference between continuity and uniform continuity.
We also created infinitesimals, only to throw up our hands because we could not make a logic that fit them. Infinitesimals were temporarily replaced by the use of epsilon-delta methods.

We began to understand that there are different kinds of spaces. For example, there were other models of some of Euclid’s axioms than just Euclidean space, and some of those models showed that the parallel axiom is independent of the other axioms. And we became aware of many kinds of topological spaces and manifolds.

We started to investigate sets, in part because spaces have sets of points. Then we discovered that a perfectly innocent activity like considering the set of all sets resulted in an impossibility.

We were led to consider how to understand the Axiom of Choice from several upsetting discoveries. For example, the Banach-Tarski “paradox” implies that you can rearrange the points in a sphere of radius $1$ to make two spheres of radius $1$.

Mathematics adopts a new covenant… for awhile

These problems caused a kind of tightening up, or rigorizing.
For a period of time, less than a century, we settled into a standard way of practicing research mathematics called new math or modern math. Those names were used mostly by math educators. Research mathematicians might have called it axiomatic math based on set theory. Although I was around for the last part of that period I was not aware of any professional mathematicians calling it anything at all; it was just what we did.

First, we would come up with a new concept, type of math object, or a new theorem. In this creative process we would freely use intuition, metaphors, images and analogies.

Example

We might come up with the idea that a function reaches its maximum when its graph swoops up from the left, then goes horizontally for an infinitesimal amount of time, then swoops down to the right. The point at which it was going horizontally would obviously have to be the maximum.

But when we came to publish a paper about the subject, all these pictures would disappear. All our visual, metaphorical/conceptual and kinetic feelings that explain the phenomenon would have to be suppressed.

Rigorizing consisted of a set of practices, which I will hint at:

Orthodox behavior among mathematicians in 1950

Definition in terms of sets and axioms

Each mathematical object had to be defined in some way that started with a set and some other data defined in terms of the set. Axioms were imposed on these data. Everything had to be defined in terms of sets, including functions and relations. (Multiple sets were used occasionally.)

Definitions done in this way omit a lot of the intuition that we have concerning the object being defined.

Examples
  • The definition of group as a set with a binary operation satisfying some particular axioms does not tell you that groups constitute the essence of symmetry.
  • The definitions of equivalence relation and of partition do not even hint that they define the same concept.

Even so, definitions done in this way have an advantage: They tend to be close to minimal in the sense that to verify that something fits the definition requires checking no more (or not much more) than necessary.

Proofs had to be clearly translatable into symbolic logic

First order logic (and other sorts of logic) were well developed and proofs were written in a way that they could in principle be reduced to arguments written in the notation of symbolic logic and following the rules of inference of logic. This resulted in proofs which did not appeal to intuition, metaphors or pictures.

Example

In the case of the theorem that the maximum of a (differentiable) function occurs only where the derivative is zero, that meant epsilon-delta proofs in which the proof appeared as a thick string of symbols. Here, “thick” means it had superscripts, subscripts, and other things that gave the string a fractal dimension of about $1.2$ (just guessing!).

Example

When I was a student at Oberlin College in 1959, Fuzzy Vance (Elbridge P. Vance) would sometimes stop in the middle of an epsilon-delta proof and draw pictures and provide intuition. Before he started that he would say “Shut the door, don’t tell anyone”. (But he told us!)

Example

A more famous example of this is the story that Oscar Zariski, when presenting a proof in algebraic geometry at the board, would sometimes remind himself of a part of a proof by hunching over the board so the students couldn’t see what he was doing and drawing a diagram which he would immediately erase. (I fault him for not telling them about the diagram.)

It doesn’t matter whether this story is true or not. It is true in the sense that any good myth is true.

Commercial

I wrote about rigor in these articles:

Rigorous view in abstractmath.org.

Dry bones, post in this blog.

Logic and sets clarify but get in the way

The orthodox method of “define it by sets and axioms” and “makes proofs at least resemble first order logic” clarified a lot of suspect proofs. But it got in the way of intuition and excessive teaching by using proofs made it harder to students to learn.

  • The definition of a concept can make you think of things that are foreign to your intuition of the concept. A function is a mapping,. The ordered pairs are a secondary construction; you should not think of ordered pairs as essential to your intuition. Even so the definition of function in terms of ordered pairs got rid of a lot of cobwebs.
  • The cartesian product of sets is obviously an associative binary operation. Except that if you define the cartesian product of sets in terms of ordered pairs then it is not associative.
  • Not only that, but if you define the ordered pair $(a,b)$ as $\{\{a,b\},a\}$ the you have to say that $a$ is an element of $(a,b)$ but $b$ is not That is not merely an inconvenient definition of ordered pair, it is wrong. It is not bad way to show that the concept of ordered pair is consistent with ZF set theory, but that is a minor point mathematicians hardly ever worry about.

Mathematical methods applied to everything

The early methods described at the beginning of this post began to be used everywhere in math.

Algorithms on symbols

Algorithms, or methodical procedures, began with the addition and multiplication algorithms and Euclid’s ruler and compass constructions, but they began to be used everywhere.

They are applied to the symbols of math, for example to describe rules for calculating derivatives and integrals and for summing infinite series.

Algorithms are used on strings, arrays and diagrams of math symbols, for example concatenating lists, multiplying matrices, and calculating binary operations on trees.

Algorithms as definitions

Algorithms are used to define the strings that make up the notation of symbolic logic. Such definitions include something like: “If $E$ and $F$ are expressions than $(E)\land (F)$ and $(\forall x)(E)$ are expressions”. So if $E$ is “$x\geq 3$” then $(\forall x)(x\geq 3)$ is an expression. This had the effect of turning an expression in symbolic logic into a mathematical object. Deduction rules such as “$E\land F\vdash E$” also become mathematical objects in this way.

We can define the symbols and expressions of algebra, calculus, and other part of math using algorithms, too. This became a big deal when computer algebra programs such as Mathematica came in.

Example

You can define the set $RP$ of real polynomials this way:

  • $0\in RP$
  • If $p\in RP$ then $p+r x^n\in RP$, where $x$ is a variable and $n$ a nonnegative integer.

That is a recursive definition. You can also define polynomials by pattern recognition:

Let $n$ be a positive integer, $a_0,\,a_1\,\ldots a_n$ be real numbers and $k_0,\,k_1\,\ldots k_n$ be nonnegative integers. Then $a_0 x^{k_0}+a_1 x^{k_1}+\ldots+ a_n x^{k_n}$ is a polynomial.

The recursive version is a way of letting a compiler discover that a string of symbols is a polynomial. That sort of thing became a Big Deal when computers arrived in our world.

Algorithms on mathematical objects

I am using the word “algorithm” in a loose sense to mean any computation that may or may not give a result. Computer programs are algorithms, but so is the quadratic formula. You might not think of a formula as an algorithm, but that is because if you use it in a computer program you just type in the formula; the language compiler has a built-in algorithm to execute calculations given by formulas.

It has not been clearly understood that mathematicians apply algorithms not only to symbols, but also directly to mathematical objects. Socrates thought that way long ago, as I described in the construction of a midpoint above. The procedure says “draw circles with center at the endpoints of the line segment.” It doesn’t say “draw pictures of circles…”

In the last section and this one, I am talking about how we think of applying an algorithm. Socrates thought he was talking about ideal lines and circles that exist in some other universe that we can access by thought. We can think about them as real things without making a metaphysical claim like Socrates did about them. Our brains are wired to think of abstract ideas in some many of the same ways we think about physical objects.

Example

The unit circle (as a topological space at least) is the quotient space of the space $\mathbb{R}$ of real numbers mod the equivalence relation defined by: $x\sim y$ if and only if $x-y$ is an integer.

Mathematicians who understand that construction may have various images in their mind when they read this. One would be something like imagining the real line $\mathbb{R}$ and then gluing all the points together that are an integer apart. This is a distinctly dizzying thing to think about but mathematicians aren’t worried because they know that taking the quotient of a space is a well-understood construction that works. They might check that by imagining the unit circle as the real line wrapped around an infinite number of times, with points an integer apart corresponding to the same point on the unit circle. (When I did that check I hastily inserted the parenthetical remark saying “as a topological space” because I realized the construction doesn’t preserve the metric.) The point of this paragraph is that many mathematicians think of this construction as a construction on math objects, not a construction on symbols.

Everything is a mathematical object

A lot of concepts start out as semi-vague ideas and eventually get defined as mathematical objects.

Examples

  • A function was originally thought of as a formula, but then get formalized in the days of orthodoxy as a set of ordered pairs with the functional property.
  • The concept of equation has been turned into a math object many times, for example in universal algebra and in logic. I suspect that some practitioners in those fields might disagree with me. This requires further research.
  • Propositions are turned into math objects by Boolean Algebra.
  • Perhaps numbers were always thought of as math objects, but much later the set $\mathbb{N}$ of all natural numbers and the set $\mathbb{R}$ of all real numbers came to be thought of explicitly as math objects, causing some mathematicians to have hissy fits.
  • Definitions are math objects. This has been done in various ways. A particular theory is a mathematical object, and it is essentially a definition by definition (!): Its models are what the theory defines. A particular example of “theory” is first-order theory which was the gold standard in the orthodox era. A classifying topos is also a math object that is essentially a definition.

Category Theory

The introduction of categories broke the orthodoxy of everything-is-a-set. It has become widely used as a language in many branches of math. It started with problems in homological algebra arising in at least these two ways:

  • Homotopy classes of continuous functions are not functions in the set theory sense. So we axiomatized the concept of function as an arrow (morphism) in a category.
  • The concept of mathematical object is axiomatized as an object in a category. This forces all properties of an object to be expressed in terms of its external relations with other objects and arrows.
  • Categories capture the idea of “kind of math”. There is a category of groups and homomorphisms, a category of topological spaces and homeomorphisms, and so on. This is a new level of abstraction. Before, if someone said “I work in finite groups”, their field was a clear idea and people knew what they were talking about, but now the category of finite groups is a mathematical object.
  • Homology maps one kind of math (topology) into another kind (algebra). Since categories capture the general notion of “kind of math”, we invented the idea of functor to capture the idea of modeling or representing one branch of math in another one. So Homology became a mathematical object.
  • The concept of functor allowed the definition of natural transformation as a mathematical object. Before categories, naturality was only an informal idea.

Advantages of category theory

  • Categories, in the form of toposes, quickly became candidates to replace set theory as a foundation system for math. They are more flexible and allow the kind of logic you want to use (classical, intuitionistic and others) to be a parameter in your foundational system.
  • “Arrow” (morphism) replaced not only the concept of function but also the concept of “element of” (“$\in$”). It allows the concept of variable elements. (This link is to a draft of a section of abstractmath.org that has not been included in the table of contents yet.) It also requires that an “element” has to be an element of one single object; for example, the maps $1\to \mathbb{N}$ and $1\to \mathbb{R}$ that pick out the number $42$ are not the same maps, although of course they are related by the canonical inclusion map $\mathbb{N}\to\mathbb{R}$.
  • Diagrams are used in proofs and give much better immediate understanding than formulas written in strings, which compress a lot of things unnecessarily into thick strings that require understanding lots of conventions and holding things in your memory.
  • Categories-as-kinds-of-math makes it easy to turn an analogy, for example between products of groups and products of spaces, into two examples of the same kind of mathematical object: Namely, a product in a category.

Disadvantages of category theory

  • Category theory requires a new way of thinking. Some people think that is a disadvantage. But genuine innovation is always disruptive. New technology breaks old technology. Of course, the new technology has to turn out to be useful to win out.
  • Category theory has several notions of “equal”. Objects can be the same or isomorphic. Categories can be isomorphic or equivalent. When you are doing category theory, you should never worry about whether two objects are equal: that is considered evil. Category theorists generally ignored the fuzziness of this problem because you can generally get away with it. Still, it was an example of something that had not been turned into a mathematical definition. Two ways of accomplishing this are anafunctors and homotopy type theory.

I expect to write about homotopy type theory soon. It may be the Next Revolution.

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Thinking about a function as a mathematical object

A mathematician’s mental representation of a function is generally quite rich and may involve many different metaphors and images kept in mind simultaneously. The abmath article on metaphors and images for functions discusses many of these representations, although the article is incomplete. This post is a fairly thorough rewrite of the discussion in that article of the representation of the concept of “function” as a mathematical object. You must think of functions as math objects when you are taking the rigorous view, which happens when you are trying to prove something about functions (or large classes of functions) in general.

What often happens is that you visualize one of your functions in many of the ways described in this article (it is a calculation, it maps one space to another, its graph is bounded, and so on) but those images can mislead you. So when you are completely stuck, you go back to thinking of the function as an axiomatically-defined mathe­matical structure of some sort that just sits there, like a complicated machine where you can see all the parts and how they relate to each other. That enables you to prove things by strict logical deduction. (Mathematicians mostly only go this far when they are desperate. We would much rather quote somebody’s theorem.) This is what I have called the dry bones approach.

The “mathematical structure” is most commonly a definition of function in terms of sets and axioms. The abmath article Specification and definition of “function” discusses the usual definitions of “function” in detail.

Example

This example is intended to raise your consciousness about the possibilities for functions as objects.

Consider the function $f:\mathbb{R}\to\mathbb{R}$ defined by $f(x)=2{{\sin }^{2}}x-1$. Its value can be computed at many different numbers but it is a single, static math object.

You can apply operators to it

  • Just as you can multiply a number by $2$, you can multiply $f$ by $2$.   You can say “Let $g(x)=2f(x)$” or “Let $g=2f$”. Multiplying a numerical function by $2$ is an operator that take the function $f$ to $2f$. Its input is a function and its output is another function. Then the value of $g$ (which is $2f$) at any real $x$ is $g(x)=2f(x)=4{{\sin }^{2}}x-2$. The notation  “$g=2f$” reveals that mathematicians think of $f$ as a single math object just as the $3$ in the expression “$2\times 3$” represents the number $3$ as a single object.
  • But you can’t do arithmetic operations to functions that don’t have numerical output, such as the function $\text{FL}$ that takes an English word to its first letter, so $\text{FL}(`\text{wolf’})=`\text{w’}$. (The quotes mean that I am writing about the word ‘wolf’ and the letter ‘w’.) The expression $2\times \text{FL}(`\text{wolf’})$ doesn’t make sense because ‘w’ is a letter, not a number.
  • You can find the derivative.  The derivative operator is a function from differentiable functions to functions. Such a thing is usually called an operator.  The derivative operator is sometimes written as $D$, so $Df$ is the function defined by: “$(Df)(x)$ is the slope of the tangent line to $f$ at the point $(x,f(x)$.” That is a perfectly good definition. In calculus class you learn formulas that allow you to calculate $(Df)(x)$ (usually called “$f'(x)$”) to be $4 \sin (x) \cos (x)$.

Like all math objects, functions may have properties

  • The function defined by $f(x)=2{{\sin}^{2}}x-1$ is differentiable, as noted above. It is also continuous.
  • But $f$ is not injective. This means that two different inputs can give the same output. For example,$f(\frac{\pi}{3})=f(\frac{4\pi}{3})=\frac{1}{2}$. This is a property of the whole function, not individual values. It makes no sense to say that $f(\frac{\pi}{3})$ is injective.
  • The function $f$ is periodic with period $2\pi$, meaning that for any $x$, $f(x+2\pi)=f(x)$.     It is the function itself that has period $2\pi$, not any particular value of it.  

As a math object, a function can be an element of a set

  • For example,$f$ is an element of the set ${{C}^{\infty }}(\mathbb{R})$ of real-valued functions that have derivatives of all orders.
  • On ${{C}^{\infty }}(\mathbb{R})$, differentiation is an operator that takes a function in that set to another function in the set.   It takes $f(x)$ to the function $4\sin x\cos x$.
  • If you restrict $f$ to the unit interval, it is an element of the function space ${{\text{L}}^{2}}[0,1]$.   As such it is convenient to think of it as a point in the space (the whole function is the point, not just values of it).    In this particular space, you can think of the points as vectors in an uncountably-infinite-dimensional space. (Ideas like that weird some people out. Do not worry if you are one of them. If you keep on doing math, function spaces will seem ordinary. They are OK by me, except that I think they come in entirely too many different kinds which I can never keep straight.) As a vector, $f$ has a norm, which you can think of as its length. The norm of $f$ is about $0.81$.

The discussion above shows many examples of thinking of a function as an object. You are thinking about it as an undivided whole, as a chunk, just as you think of the number $3$ (or $\pi$) as just a thing. You think the same way about your bicycle as a whole when you say, “I’ll ride my bike to the library”. But if the transmission jams, then you have to put it down on the grass and observe its individual pieces and their relation to each other (the chain came off a gear or whatever), in much the same way as noticing that the function $g(x)=x^3$ goes through the origin and looks kind of flat there, but at $(2,8)$ it is really rather steep. Phrases like “steep” and “goes through the origin” are a clue that you are thinking of the function as a curve that goes left to right and levels off in one place and goes up fast in another — you are thinking in a dynamic, not a static way like the dry bones of a math object.

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Shared mental objects

Notes on viewing

Shared mental objects

I propose the phrase "shared mental object" to name the sort of thing that includes mathematical objects, abstract objects, fictional objects and other concepts with the following properties: ​

  • They are not physical objects
  • We think of them as objects 
  • We share them with other people

It is the name "shared mental object" that is a new idea; the concept has been around in philosophy and math ed for awhile and has been called various things, especially "abstract object", which is the name I have used in abstractmath.

I will go into detail concerning some examples in order to make the concept clear.  If you examine this concept deeply you discover many fine points, nested ideas and circles of examples that go back on themselves.  I will not get very far into these fine points here, but I have written about some of them posts and in abmath (see references).  I am working on a post about some of the fine points and will publish it if I can control its tendency to expand into infinite proliferation and recursion.

Examples

 

Messages

There is a story about the early days of telegraphy:  A man comes into the newly-opened telegraph station and asks to send a telegram to his son who is working in another city. He writes out the message and gives it to the operator with his payment.  The operator puts the message on a spike and clicks the key in front of him for a while, then says, "I have sent your message.  Thanks for shopping at Postal Telegraph".  The man looks astonished and points at the message and says, "But it is still here!"

A message is a shared mental object.  

  • It may be represented by a physical object, such as a piece of paper with writing on it, and people commonly refer to the paper as the message.  
  • It may be a verbal message from you, perhaps delivered by another person to a third person by speech.  
  • The delivery process may introduce errors (so can sending a telegraph).  So the thoughts in the three brains (the sender, the deliverer and the recipient) can differ from each other, but they can still talk about "the message" as if it were one object.

Other examples that are similar in nature to messages are schedules and the month of September (see Math Objects in abmath, where they are called abstract objects.).  In English-speaking communities, September is a cultural default: you are expected to know what it is. You can know that September is a month and that right this minute it is not September (unless it is September). You may think that September has 31 days and most people would say you are wrong, but they would agree that you and they are talking about the same month.

The general concept of the month of September and facts concerning it have been in shared existence in English-speaking cultural groups for (maybe) a thousand years.  In contrast, a message is usually shared by only two or three people and it has a short life; a few years from now, it may be that none of the people involved with the message remember what it said or even that it existed.

Symbols

symbol, such as the letter "a" or the integral sign "$\int$", is a shared mental object.  Like the month of September, but unlike messages, letters are shared by large cultural entities, every language community that uses the Latin alphabet (and more) in the case of "a", and math and tech people in the case of "$\int$". 

The letter "a" is represented physically on paper, a blackboard or a screen, among other things.  If you are literate in English and recognize an occurrence as representing the letter, you probably do this using a process in the brain that is automatic and that operates outside your awareness

Literate readers of English also generally agree that a string of letters either does or does not represent the word "default" but there are borderline cases (as in those little boxes where you have to prove you are not a robot) where they may disagree or admit that they don't know.  Even so, the letter "a" and the word "default" are shared in the minds of many people and there is general (but not absolutely universal) agreement on when you are seeing representations of them.

Fictional objects

Fictional objects such as Sherlock Holmes and unicorns are shared mental objects.  I wrote briefly about them in Mathematical objects and will not go into them here.  

Mathematical objects 

The integer $111$, the integral $\int_0^1 x^2\,dx$ and the set of all real numbers are all mathematical objects.   They are all shared mental objects.  In most of the world, people with a little education will know that $111$ is a number and what it means to have $111$ beans in a jar (for example).  They know that it is one more that $110$ and a lot more than $42$.  

Mathematicians, scientists and STEM students will know something about what  $\int_0^1 x^2\,dx$ means and they will probably know how to calculate it.  Most  of them may be able to do it in their head.  I have taught calculus so many times that I know it "by heart", which means that it is associated in my brain with the number $1/3$ in such a way that when I see the integral the number automatically and without effort pops us (in the same way that I know September has 30 days).

Beginning calculus students may have a confused and incorrect understanding of the set of all real numbers in several ways, but practicing mathematicians (and many others) know that it is an uncountably infinite dense set and they think of it as an object.  A student very likely does not think of it as an object, but as a sprawling unimaginable space that you cannot possibly regard as a thing. Students may picture a real number as having another real number sitting right beside it — the next biggest one. Most practicing mathematicians think of the set of real numbers as a completed infinity — every real number is already there —  and they know that between any two of them there is another one.

As a consequence, when students and professors talk about real numbers the student finds that some times the professor says things that sound completely wrong and the professor hears the student say things that are bizarre and confused.  They firmly believe they are talking about the same thing, the real numbers, but the student is seen by the professor as wrong and the professor is seen by the students as talking meaningless nonsense.  Even so, they believe they are talking about the same thing.

Nomenclature

I tried various other names before I came to "shared mental objects".

  • I called them abstract objects in abstractmath.  The word "abstract" does not convey their actual character — they are mental and they are shared.
  • They are non-physical objects, a phrase widely used in philosophy, but naming something by a negation is always a bad idea.  
  • Co-mental objects is ugly and comental looks like a misspelling.
  • Intermental objects sounds like it has something to do with burial.  Maybe InterMental?
  • The word entity may avoid some confusion caused by the word "object", which suggests physical object.  But "object" is widely used in philosophy and in math ed in the way it is used here.
  • Meme?  Well, in some sense a shared mental object is a meme.  Memes have a connotation of forcing themselves into your brain that I don't want, but I want to consider the relationship further.

The major advantage of "shared mental object" is that it describes the important properties of the concept: It is a mental object and it is shared by people.  It has no philosophical implications concerning platonism, either. Mathematical objects do have special properties of verifiability that general shared mental objects do not, but my terminology does not suggest any existence of absolute truth or of an Ideal existing in another world.  I don't believe in such things, but some people do and I want to point out that "shared mental object" does not rule such things out — it merely gives a direct evidence-based description of a phenomenon that actually exists in the real world.

References  

Abstract objects in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Abstract object in Wikipedia

Mathematical objects in abstractmath

Mathematical objects in Wikipedia

What is Mathematics, Really?  R. Hersh, Oxford University Press, 1997

Previous posts

Representations of mathematical objects 

Representations III: Rigor and Rigor Mortis

Representations II: Dry Bones

Notes on Viewing  

This post uses MathJax. If you see mathematical expressions with dollar signs around them, or badly formatted formulas, try refreshing the screen. Sometimes you have to do it two or three times.

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Representations of mathematical objects

This is a long post. Notes on viewing.

About this post

A mathematical object, or a type of math object, is represented in practice in a great variety of ways, including some that mathematicians rarely think of as "representations".  

In this post you will find examples and comments about many different types of representations as well as references to the literature. I am not aware that anyone has considered all these different ideas of representation in one place before. Reading through this post should raise your consciousness about what is going on when you do math.  

This is also an experiment in exposition.  The examples are discussed in a style similar to the way a Mathematica command is discussed in the Documentation Center, using mostly nonhierarchical bulleted lists. I find it easy to discover what I want to know when it is written in that way.  (What is hard is discovering the name of a command that will do what I want.)

Types of representations

Using language

  • Language can be used to define a type of object.
  • A definition is intended to be precise enough to determine all the properties that objects of that type all have.  (Pay attention to the two uses of the word "all" in that sentence; they are both significant, in very different ways.)
  • Language can be used to describe an object, exhibiting properties without determining all properties.
  • It can also provide metaphors, making use of one of the basic tools of our brain to understand the world. 
  • The language used is most commonly mathematical English, a special dialect of English.
  • The symbolic language of mathematics (distinct from mathematical English) is used widely in calculations. Phrases from the symbolic language are often embedded in a statement in math English. The symbolic language includes among others algebraic notation and logical notation. 
  • The language may also be a formal language, a language that is mathematically defined and is thus itself a mathematical object. Logic texts generally present the first order predicate calculus as a formal language. 
  • Neither mathematical English nor the symbolic language is a formal language. Both allow irregularities and ambiguities.

Mathematical objects

The representation itself may be a mathematical object, such as:

  • A linear representation of a group. Not only are the groups mathematical objects, so is the representation.
  • An embedding of a manifold into Euclidean space. A definition given in a formal language of the first order predicate calculus of the property of commutativity of binary operations. (Thus a property can be represented as a math object.)

Visual representations

A math object can be represented visually using a physical object such as a picture, graph (in several senses), or diagram.  

  • The visual processing of our brain is our major source of knowledge of the world and takes about a fifth of the brain's processing power.  We can learn many things using our vision that would take much longer to learn using verbal descriptions.  (Proofs are a different matter.)
  • When you look at a graph (for example) your brain creates a mental representation of the graph (see below).

Mental representations

If you are a mathematician, a math object such as "$42$", "the real numbers" or "continuity" has a mental representation in your brain.  

  • In the math ed literature, such a representation is called "mental image", "concept image", "procept", or "schema".   (The word "image" in these names is not thought of as necessarily visual.) 
  • The procept or schema describe all the things that come to mind when you think about a particular math object: The definition, important theorems, visual images, important examples, and various metaphors that help you understand it. 
  • The visual images occuring in a mental schema for an object may themselves be mental representations of physical objects. The examples and theorems may be mental representations of ideas you learned from language or pictures, and so on.  The relationships between different kinds of representations get quite convoluted.

Metaphors

Conceptual metaphors are a particular kind of mental representation of an object which involve mentally associating some aspects of the objects with some aspects of something else — a physical object, an image, an action or another abstract object.

  • A conceptual metaphor may give you new insight into the object.
  • It may also mislead you because you think of properties of the other object that the math object doesn't have.
  • A graph of a function is a conceptual metaphor.
  • When you say that a point on a graph "rises as it goes from left to right" your metaphor is an action. 
  • When you say that the cosets of a normal subgroup of a group "get along" with the group multiplication, your metaphor identifies a property they have with an aspect of human behavior.

Properties of representations

A representation of a math object may or may not

  • determine it completely
  • exhibit some of its properties
  • suggest easy proofs of some theorems
  • provide a useful way of thinking about it
  • mislead you about the object's properties
  • mislead you about what is significant about the object

Examples of representations

This list shows many of the possibilities of representation.  In each case I discuss the example in terms of the two bulleted lists above. Some of the examples are reused from my previous publications.

Functions

Example (F1) "Let $f(x)$ be the function defined by $f(x)=x^3-x$."

  • This is an expression in mathematical English that a fluent reader of mathematical English will recognize gives a definition of a specific function.
  • (F1) is therefore a representation of that function.  
  • The word "representation" is not usually used in this way in math.  My intention is that it should be recognized as the same kind of object as many other representations.
  • The expression contains the formula $x^3-x$.  This is an encapsulated computation in the symbolic language of math. It allows someone who knows basic algebra and calculus to perform calculations that find the roots, extrema and inflection points of the function $f$.  
  • The word "let" suggests to the fluent reader of mathematical English that (F1) is a definition which is probably going to hold for the next chunk of text, but probably not for the whole article or book.
  • Statements in mathematical English are generally subject to conventions.  In a calculus text (F1) would automatically mean that the function had the real numbers as domain and codomain.
  • The last two remarks show that a beginner has to learn to read mathematical English. 
  • Another convention is discussed in the following diatribe.

Diatribe 

You would expect $f(x)$ by itself to mean the value of $f$ at $x$, but in (F1) the $x$ has the property of a bound variable.  In mathematical English, "let" binds variables. However, after the definition, in the text the "$x$" in the expression "$f(x)$" will be free, but the $f$ will be bound to the specific meaning.  It is reasonable to say that the term "$f(x)$" represents the expression "$x^3-x$" and that $f$ is the (temporary) name of the function. Nevertheless, it is very common to say "the function $f(x)$" to mean $f$.  

A fluent reader of mathematical English knows all this, but probably no one has ever said it explicitly to them.  Mathematical English and the symbolic language should be taught explicitly, including its peculiarities such as "the function $f(x)$".  (You may want to deprecate this usage when you teach it, but students deserve to understand its meaning.)

The positive integers

You have a mental representation of the positive integers $1,2,3,\ldots$.  In this discussion I will assume that "you" know a certain amount of math.  Non-mathematicians may have very different mental representations of the integers.

  • You have a concept of "an integer" in some operational way as an abstract object.
  • "Abstract object" needs a post of its own. Meanwhile see Mathematical Objects (abstractmath) and the Wikipedia articles on Mathematical objects and Abstract objects.
  • You have a connection in your brain between the concept of integer and the concept of listing things in order, numbering them by $1,2,3,\ldots$.
  • You have a connection in your brain between the concept of an integer and the concept of counting a finite number of objects.  But then you need zero!
  • You understand how to represent an integer using the decimal representation, and perhaps representations to other bases as well. 
  • Your mental image has the integer "$42"$ connected to but not the same as the decimal representation "42". This is not true of many students.
  • The decimal rep has a picture of the string "42" associated to it, and of course the picture of the string may come up when you think of the integer $42$ as well (it does for me — it is a an icon for the number $42$.)
  • You have a concept of the set of integers. 
  • Students need to be told that by convention "the set of integers" means the set of all integers.  This particularly applies to students whose native language does not have articles, but American students have trouble with this, too.
  • Your concept of  "the set of integers" may have the icon "$\mathbb{N}$" associated with it.  If you are a mathematician, the icon and the concept of the set of integers are associated with each other but not identified with each other.
  • For me, at least, the concept "set of integers" is mentally connected to each integer by the "element of" relation. (See third bullet below.)
  • You have a mental representation of the fact that the set of integers is infinite.  
  • This does not mean that your brain contains an infinite number of objects, but that you have a representation of infinity as a concept, it is brain-connected to the concept of the set of integers, and also perhaps to a proof of the fact that $\mathbb{N}$ is infinite.
  • In particular, the idea that the set of integers is mentally connected to each integer does not mean that the whole infinite number of integers is attached in your brain to the concept of the set of integers.  Rather, the idea is a predicate in your brain.  When it is connected to "$42$", it says "yes".  To "$\pi$" it says "No".
  • Philosophers worry about the concept of completed infinity.  It exists as a concept in your brain that interacts as a meme with concepts in other mathematicians' brains. In that way, and in that way only (as far as I am concerned) it is a physical object, in particular an object that exists in scattered physical form in a social network.

Graph of a function

This is a graph of the function $y=x^3-x$:

Graph of a cubic function

  • The graph is a physical object, either on a screen or on paper
  • It is processed by your visual system, the most powerful sensory management system in your brain
  • It also represents the graph in the mathematical sense (set of ordered pairs) of the function $y=x^3-x$
  • Both the mathematical graph and the physical graph are represented by modules in your brain, which associates the two of them with each other by a conceptual metaphor
  • The graph shows some properties of the function: inflection point, going off to infinity in a specific way, and so on.
  • These properties are made apparent (if you are knowledgeable) by means of the powerful pattern recognition system in your brain. You see them much more quickly than you can discover them by calculation.
  • These properties are not proved by the graph. Nevertheless, the graph communicates information: for example, it suggests that you can prove that there is an inflection point near $(0,0)$.
  • The graph does not determine or define the function: It is inaccurate and it does not (cannot) show all of the graph.
  • More subtle details about this graph are discussed in my post Representations 2.

Continuity

Example (C1) The $\epsilon-\delta$ definition of the continuity of a function $f:\mathbb{R}\to\mathbb{R}$ may be given in the symbolic language of math:

A function $f$ is continuous at a number $c$ if \[\forall\epsilon(\epsilon\gt0\implies(\forall x(\exists\delta(|x-c|\lt\delta\implies|f(x)-f(c)|\lt\epsilon)))\]

  • To understand (C1), you must be familiar with the notation of first order logic.  For most students, getting the notation right is quite a bit of work.  
  • You must also understand  the concepts, rules and semantics of first order logic.  
  • Even if you are familiar with all that, continuity is still a difficult concept to understand.
  • This statement does show that the concept is logically complicated. I don't see how it gives any other intuition about the concept. 

Example (C2) The definition of continuity can also be represented in mathematical English like this:

A function $f$ is continuous at a number $c$ if for any $\epsilon\gt0$ and for any $x$ there is a $\delta$ such that if $|x-c|\lt\delta$, then $|f(x)-f(c)|\lt\epsilon$. 

  • This definition doesn't give any more intuition that (C1) does.
  • It is easier to read that (C1) for most math students, but it still requires intimate familiarity with the quirks of math English.
  • The fact that "continuous" is in boldface signals that this is a definition.  This is a convention.
  • The phrase "For any $\epsilon\gt0$" contains an unmarked parenthetic insertion that makes it grammatically incoherent.  It could be translated as: "For any $\epsilon$ that is greater than $0$".  Most math majors eventually understand such things subconsciously.  This usage is very common.
  • Unless it is explicitly pointed out, most students won't notice that  if you change the phrase "for any $x$ there is a $\delta$"  to "there is a $\delta$ for any $x$" the result means something quite different.  Cauchy never caught onto this.
  • In both (C1) and (C2), the "if" in the phrase "A function $f$ is continuous at a number $c$ if…" means "if and only if" because it is in a definition.  Students rarely see this pointed out explicitly.  

Example (C3) The definition of continuity can be given in a formally defined first order logical theory

  • The theory would have to contain function symbols and axioms expressing the algebra of real numbers as an ordered field. 
  • I don't know that such a definition has ever been given, but there are various semi-automated and automated theorem-proving systems (which I know little about) that might be able to state such a definition.  I would appreciate information about this.
  • Such a definition would make the property of continuity a mathematical object.
  • An automated theorem-proving system might be able to prove that $x^3-x$ is continuous, but I wonder if the resulting proof would aid your intuition much.

Example (C4) A function from one topological space to another is continuous if the inverse of every open set in the codomain is an open set in the domain.

  • This definition is stated in mathematical English.
  • All definitions start with primitive data. 
  • In definitions (C1) – (C3), the primitive data are real numbers and the statement uses properties of an ordered field.
  • In (C4), the data are real numbers and the arithmetic operations of a topological field, along with the open sets of the field. The ordering is not mentioned.
  • This shows that a definition need not mention some important aspects of the structure. 
  • One marvelous example of this is that  a partition of a set and an equivalence relation on a set are based on essentially disjoint sets of data, but they define exactly the same type of structure.

Example (C4) "The graph of a continuous function can be drawn without picking up the chalk".

  • This is a metaphor that associates an action with the graph.
  • It is incorrect: The graphs of some continuous functions cannot be drawn.  For example, the function $x\mapsto x^2\sin(1/x)$ is continuous on the interval $[-1,1]$ but cannot be drawn at $x=0$. 
  • Generally speaking, if the function can be drawn then it can be drawn without picking up the chalk, so the metaphor provides a useful insight, and it provides an entry into consciousness-raising examples like the one in the preceding bullet.

References

  1. 1.000… and .999… (post)
  2. Conceptual blending (post)
  3. Conceptual blending (Wikipedia)
  4. Conceptual metaphors (Wikipedia)
  5. Convention (abstractmath)
  6. Definitions (abstractmath)
  7. Embodied cognition (Wikipedia)
  8. Handbook of mathematical discourse (see articles on conceptual blendmental representationrepresentationmetaphor, parenthetic assertion)
  9. Images and Metaphors (abstractmath).
  10. The interplay of text, symbols and graphics in math education, Lin Hammill
  11. Math and the modules of the mind (post)
  12. Mathematical discourse: Language, symbolism and visual images, K. L. O’Halloran.
  13. Mathematical objects (abmath)
  14. Mathematical objects (Wikipedia)
  15. Mathematical objects are “out there?” (post)
  16. Metaphors in computing science ​(post)
  17. Procept (Wikipedia)
  18. Representations 2 (post)     
  19. Representations and models (abstractmath)
  20. Representations II: dry bones (post)
  21. Representation theorems (Wikipedia) Concrete representations of abstractly defined objects.
  22. Representation theory (Wikipedia) Linear representations of algebraic structures.
  23. Semiotics, symbols and mathematical visualization, Norma Presmeg, 2006.
  24. The transition to formal thinking in mathematics, David Tall, 2010
  25. Theory in mathematical logic (Wikipedia)
  26. What is the object of the encapsulation of a process? Tall et al., 2000.
  27. Where mathematics comes from, by George Lakoff and Rafael Núñez, Basic Books, 2000. 
  28. Where mathematics comes from (Wikipedia) This is a review of the preceding book.  It is a permanent link to the version of 04:23, 25 October 2012.  The review is opinionated, partly wrong, not well written and does not fit the requirements of a Wikipedia entry.  I recommend it anyway; it is well worth reading.  It contains links to three other reviews.

Notes on Viewing  

This post uses MathJax. If you see mathematical expressions with dollar signs around them, or badly formatted formulas, try refreshing the screen. Sometimes you have to do it two or three times.

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Representing and thinking about sets

The interactive examples in this post require installing Wolfram CDF player, which is free and works on most desktop computers using Firefox, Safari and Internet Explorer, but not Chrome. The source code is the Mathematica Notebook Representing sets.nb, which is available for free use under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License. The notebook can be read by CDF Player if you cannot make the embedded versions in this post work.

Representations of sets

Sets are represented in the math literature in several different ways, some mentioned here.  Also mentioned are some other possibilities.  Introducing a variety of representations of any type of math object is desirable because students tend to assume that the representation is the object.

Curly bracket notation

The standard representation for a finite set is of the form "$\{1,3,5,6\}$". This particular example represents the unique set containing the integers $1$, $3$, $5$ and $6$ and nothing else. This means precisely that the statement "$n$ is an element of $S$" is true if $n=1$, $n=3$, $n=5$ or $n=6$, and it is false if $n$ represents any other mathematical object. 

In the way the notation is usually used, "$\{1,3,5,6\}$", "$\{3,1,5,6\}$", "$\{1,5,3,6\}$",  "$\{1,6,3,5,1\}$" and $\{ 6,6,3,5,1,5\}$ all represent the same set. Textbooks sometimes say "order and repetition don't matter". But that is a statement about this particular representation style for sets. It is not a statement about sets.

It would be nice to come up with a representation for sets that doesn't involve an ordering. Traditional algebraic notation is essentially one-dimensional and so automatically imposes an ordering (see Algebra is a difficult foreign language).    

Let the elements move

In Visible Algebra II, I experimented with the idea of putting the elements at random inside a circle and letting them visibly move around like goldfish in a bowl.  (That experiment was actually for multisets but it applies to sets, too.)  This is certainly a representation that does not impose an ordering, but it is also distracting.  Our visual system is attracted to movement (but not as much as a cat's visual system).  

Enforce natural ordering

One possibility would be to extend the machinery in a visible algebra system that allows you to make a box you could drag elements into. 

This box would order the elements in some canonical order (numerical order for numbers, alphabetical order for strings of letters or words) with the property that if you inserted an element in the wrong place it would rearrange itself, and if you tried to insert an element more than once the representation would not change.  What you would then have is a unique representation of the set.

An example is the device below.  (If you have Mathematica, not just CDF player, you can type in numbers as you wish instead of having to use the buttons.) 

This does not allow a representation of a heterogenous set such as $\{3,\mathbb{R},\emptyset,\left(\begin{array}{cc}1&2\\0&1\\ \end{array}\right)\}$.  So what?  You can't represent every function by a graph, either.

Hanger notation

The tree notation used in my visual algebra posts could be used for sets as well, as illustrated below. The system allows you to drag the elements listed into different positions, including all around the set node. If you had a node for lists, that would not be possible.

This representation has the pedagogical advantage of shows that a set is not its elements.

  • A set is distinct from its elements
  • A set is completely determined by what the elements are.

Pattern recognition

Infinite sets are sometimes represented using the curly bracket notation using a pattern that defines the set.  For example, the set of even integers could be represented by $\{0,2,4,6,\ldots\}$.  Such a representation is necessarily a convention, since any beginning pattern can in fact represent an infinite number of different infinite sets.  Personally, I would write, "Consider the even integers $\{0,2,4,6,\ldots\}$", but I would not write,  "Consider the set $\{0,2,4,6,\ldots\}$".

By the way, if you are writing for newbies, you should say,"Consider the set of even integers $\{0,2,4,6,\ldots\}$". The sentence "Consider the even integers $\{0,2,4,6,\ldots\}$" is unambiguous because by convention a list of numbers in curly brackets defines a set. But newbies need lots of redundancy.

Representation by a sentence

Setbuilder notation is exemplified by $\{x|x>0\}$, which denotes the positive reals, given a convention or explicit statement that $x$ represents a real number.  This allows the representation of some infinite sets without depending on a possibly ambiguous pattern. 

A Visible Algebra system needs to allow this, too. That could be (necessarily incompletely) done in this way:

  • You type in a sentence into a Setbuilder box that defines the set.
  • You then attach a box to the Setbuilder box containing a possible element.
  • The system then answers Yes, No, or Can't Tell.

The Can't Tell answer is a necessary requirement because the general question of whether an element is in a set defined by a first order sentence is undecidable. Perhaps the system could add some choices:

  • Try for a second.
  • Try for an hour.
  • Try for a year.
  • Try for the age of the universe.

Even so, I'll bet a system using Mathematica could answer many questions like this for sentences referring to a specific polynomial, using the Solve or NSolve command.  For example, the answer to the question, "Is $3\in\{n|n\lt0 \text{ and } n^2=9\}$?" (where $n$ ranges over the integers) would be "No", and the answer to  "Is $\{n|n\lt0 \text{ and } n^2=9\}$ empty?" would also be "No". [Corrected 2012.10.24]

References

  1. Explaining “higher” math to beginners (previous post)
  2. Algebra is a difficult foreign language (previous post)
  3. Visible Algebra II (previous post)
  4. Sets: Notation (abstractmath article)
  5. Setbuilder notation (Wikipedia)
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