Tag Archives: Atish Bagchi

Proofs using diagrams

Introduction

This post gives a proof of an easy theorem in category theory using the graph-based logic approach of Graph based logic and sketches, (GBLS) by Atish Bagchi and me.

Formal logic is typically defined in terms of formulas and terms, defined recursively as strings of characters, together with rules of inference. GBLS proposes a new approach to logic where diagrams are used instead of strings of characters. The exposition here spells out the proof in more detail than GBLS does and uses various experimental ways of drawing diagrams using Mathematica.

To follow this proof, you need to be familiar with basic category theory. Most special definitions that are needed are defined in this post where they are first used. Section 1 of GBLS also gives the definitions you need with more context.

The theorem

The Theorem to be proved (it is Theorem 8.3.1 of GBLS) says that, in any category, if the triangles in the diagram below commute, then the outside square commutes. This is easy using the associative law: If $xf=h$ and $kx=g$, then $kh=k(xf)=(kx)f=gf$.

Subject Diagram

So what?

This theorem is not interesting. The point of this post is to present a new approach to proving such theorems, using diagrams instead of strings. The reason that exhibiting the dig
rammatic proof is interesting is that many different kinds of categories have a FL cattheory, including these:

Essentially algebraic string-based logic is described in detail in Partial Horn logic and cartesian categories, by E. Palmgren and Steven Vickers.

Commercial

My concept of form in A generalization of the concept of sketch generalizes sketches to all the categories that can be defined as models of FL cattheories. So the method of proof using diagrams can be applied to theorems about the objects defined by forms.

Concepts needed for the graph-based proof

To prove the theorem, I will make use of $\mathbf{ThCat}$, the FL cattheory for categories.

  • An FL category is a category with all finite limits.
  • GLBS uses the word cattheory for what Category theory for computing science and Toposes, triples and theories call the theory of a sketch.
  • In many books and articles, and in nLab, a “sketch” is what we call the cattheory (or the theory) of a sketch. For us, the sketch is a generating collection of objects, arrows, diagrams, cones and cocones for the cattheory. The category of models of the sketch and the cattheory are equivalent.
  • $\mathbf{ThCat}$ is a category with finite limits freely generated by certain designated objects, arrows, commutative diagrams and limit cones, listed below.
  • A model of $\mathbf{ThCat}$ in $\mathbf{Set}$ (the category of sets, whichever one you like) is an FL functor $\mathfrak{C}:\mathbf{ThCat}\to\mathbf{Set}.$
  • Such a model $\mathfrak{C}$ is a small category, and every small category is such a model. If this statement worries you, read Section 3.4 of GBLS.
  • Natural transformations between models are FL-preserving functors that preserve the structure on the nose.
  • The category of models of $\mathbf{ThCat}$ in $\mathbf{Set}$ is equivalent to the category of small categories and morphisms, which, unlike the category of models, includes functors that don’t preserve things on the nose.
  • $\mathbf{ThCat}$ is an example of the theory of an FL sketch. Chapter 4 of GBLS describes this idea in detail. The theory has the same models as the sketch.
  • The sketch generating $\mathbf{ThCat}$ is defined in detail in section 7.2 of GBLS.

Some objects and arrows of $\mathbf{ThCat}$

I will make use of the following objects and arrows that occur in $\mathbf{ThCat}.$ A formal thing is a construction in $\mathbf{ThCat}$ that becomes an actual thing in a model. So for example a model $\mathfrak{C}$ of $\mathbf{ThCat}$ in $\mathbf{Set}$ is an actual (small) category, and $\mathfrak{C}(\mathsf{ar_2})$ is the set of all composable pairs of arrows in the category $\mathfrak{C}$.

  • $\mathsf{ob}$, the formal set of objects.
  • $\mathsf{ar}$, the formal set of arrows.
  • $\mathsf{ar}_2$, the formal set of composable pairs of arrows.
  • $\mathsf{ar}_3$, the formal set of composable triples of arrows.
  • $\mathsf{unit} : \mathsf{ob}\to \mathsf{ar}$ that formally picks out the identity arrow of an object.
  • $\mathsf{dom},\mathsf{cod} : \mathsf{ar}\to \mathsf{ob}$ that formally pick out the domain and codomain of an arrow.
  • $\mathsf{comp} : \mathsf{ar}_2\to \mathsf{ar}$ that picks out the composite of a composable pair.
  • $\mathsf{lfac}, \mathsf{rfac} :\mathsf{ar}_2\to \mathsf{ar}$ that pick out the left and right factors in a composable pair.
  • $\mathsf{lfac}, \mathsf{mfac},\mathsf{rfac} :\mathsf{ar}_3 \to\mathsf{ar}$ that pick out the left, middle and right factors in a composable triple of arrows.
  • $\mathsf{lass}, \mathsf{rass} : \mathsf{ar}_3 \to \mathsf{ar}_2$: $\mathsf{lass}$ formally takes $\langle{h,g,f}\rangle$ to $\langle{hg,f}\rangle$ and $\mathsf{rass}$ takes it to $\langle{h,gf}\rangle$.

$\mathsf{ob}$, $\mathsf{ar}$, $\mathsf{unit}$, $\mathsf{dom}$, $\mathsf{cod}$ and $\mathsf{comp}$ are given primitives and the others are defined as limits of finite diagrams composed of those objects. This is spelled out in Chapter 7.2 of GBLS. The definition of $\mathbf{ThCat}$ also requires certain diagrams to be commutative. They are all provided in GBLS; the one enforcing associativity is shown later in this post.

Color coding

I will use color coding to separate syntax from semantics.

  • Syntax consists of constructions in $\mathbf{ThCat}.$ The description will always be a commutative diagram in black, with annotations as explained later.
  • The limit of the description will be an object in $\mathbf{ThCat}$ (the form) whose value in a model $\mathfrak{C}$ will be shown in green, because being an element of the value of a model makes it semantics.
  • When a limit cone is defined, the projections (which are arrows in $\mathbf{ThCat}$) will be shown in blue.

Descriptions

In graph-based logic, a type of construction that can be made in a category has a description, which (in the case of our Theorem) is a finite diagram in $\mathbf{ThCat}$. The value of the limit of the description in a model $\mathfrak{C}$ is the set of all instances of that type of construction in $\mathfrak{C}$.

The Subject Diagram

  • This diagram is the subject matter of the Theorem. It is not assumed to be commutative.
  • As in most diagrams in category theory texts, the labels in this diagram are variables, so the diagram is implicitly universally quantified. The Subject Diagram is a generic diagram of its shape.
  • “Any diagram of its shape” includes diagrams in which some of the nodes may represent the same object. An extreme example is the graph in which every node is an object $\mathsf{E}$ and every arrow is its identity arrow. The diagram below is nevertheless an example of the Subject Diagram:
  • Shapes of diagrams are defined properly in Section 2.3 of
    GBLS and in Section 4.1 of Category Theory for Computing Science.

The description of the Subject Diagram

Diagram SDD below shows the Subject Diagram as the limit of its description. The description is the black diagram.


Diagram SDD

Definition of $\mathsf{ar}_2$

The object $\mathsf{ar}_2$ of composable pairs of arrows is defined as a pullback:

In the usual categorical notation this would be shown as

This makes use of the fact that the unnamed blue arrow is induced by the other two projection arrows. In the rest of the post, projection arrows that are induced are normally omitted.

An enrichment of the description

Because $\mathsf{ar}_2$ is defined as a pullback, we can enrich the description of Diagram SDD by adjoining two pullbacks as shown below. This is Diagram 8.10 in GBLS. The enriched diagram has the same limit as the description of Diagram SDD.

Enriched Diagram SDD

Note that the projections from the limit to the two occurrences of $\mathsf{ar}_2$ induce all the other projections. This follows by diagram chasing; remember that the description must be a commutative diagram.

Make the triangles commute

To make the triangles commute, we add two comp arrows to the enriched diagram as shown below. These two arrows are not induced by the description; they are therefore additions to the description — they describe a more restrictive (green) diagram with commutative triangles and so are shown in black.

Diagram TC: The triangles commute

The left comp makes $xf=h$ and the right comp makes $kx=g$.

The outside square commutes

Now we enrich Diagram TC with four objects, <comp,id>, <id,comp> and three comp arrows as shown in bolder black. These objects and arrows already exist in $\mathbf{ThCat}$ and therefore do not change the limit, which must be the same as the limit of Diagram TC.

The outside square commutes

The diagram in bold black is exactly the commutative diagram that requires associativity for these particular objects and arrows, which immediately implies that $gf=kh$, as the Theorem requires.

By the definitions of $\mathsf{ar_2}$ and $\mathsf{ar_3}$, the part of the description in bold black induces the rest of the diagram. Omitting the rest of the diagram would make $\mathsf{ar_2}$ and $\mathsf{ar_3}$ modules in the sense of GBLS, Chapter 7.4. Modules would be vital to deal with proofs more complicated than the one given here.

References

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Abstract objects

Some thoughts toward revising my article on mathematical objects.  

Mathematical objects are a kind of abstract object.  There are lots of abstract objects that are not mathematical objects,  For example, if you keep a calendar or schedule for appointments, that calendar is an abstract object.  (This example comes from [2]). 

It may be represented as a physical object or you may keep it entirely in your head.  I am not going to talk about the latter possibility, because I don't know what to say.

  1. If it is a paper calendar, that physical object represents the information that is contained in your calendar.  
  2. Same for a calendar on a computer, but that is stored as magnetic bits on a disk or in flash memory. A computer program (part of the operating system) is required to present it on the screen in such a way that you can read it.  Each time you open it, you get a new physical representation of the calendar.

Your brain contains a module (see [5], [7]) that interprets the representation in (1) or (2) and which has connections with other modules in your brain for dates, times, locations and whether the appointment is for a committee, a medical exam, or whatever.  

The calendar-interpreter module in your brain is necessary for the physical object to be a calendar.  The physical object is not in itself your calendar.  The calendar in this sense does not exist in the physical world.  It is abstract.  Since we think of it as a thing, it is an abstract object.

The abstract object "my calendar" affects the physical world (it causes you to go to the dentist next Tuesday).  The relation of the abstract object to the physical world is mediated by whatever physical object you call your calendar along with the modules in the brain that relate to it.  The modules in the brain are actions by physical objects, so this point of view does not involve Cartesian style dualism.

Note:  A module is a meme.  Are all memes modules?  This needs to be investigated.  Whatever they are, they exist as physical objects in people's brains.

Mathematical objects

A rigorous proof of a theorem about a mathematical object tends to refer to the object as if it were absolutely static and did not affect anything in the physical world.  I talked about this in [10], where I called it the dry bones representation of a mathematical object.  Mathematical objects don't have to be thought of this way, but (I suggest) what makes them mathematical objects is that they can be thought of in dry bones mode.  

If you use calculus to figure out how much fuel to use in a rocket to make it go a mile high, then actually use that amount in the rocket and send it off, your calculations have affected your physical actions, so you were thinking of the calculations as an abstract object.  But if you sit down to check your calculations, you concentrate on the steps one by one with the rules of algebra and calculus in mind.  You are looking at them as inert objects, like you would look at a bone of a dinosaur to see what species it belongs to. From that point of view your calculations form a mathematical object, because you are using the dry-bones approach.

Caveat

All this blather is about how you should think about mathematical objects.  It can be read as philosophy, but I have no intention of defending it as philosophy.  People learning abstract math at college level have a lot of trouble thinking about mathematical objects as objects, and my intention is to start clarifying some aspects of how you think about them in different circumstances.  (The operative word is "start" — there is a lot more to be said.)

About the exposition of this post (a commercial)

You will notice that I gave examples of abstract objects but did not define the word "abstract object".  I did the same with mathematical objects.  In both cases, I put the word "abstract object" or "mathematical object" in boldface at a suitable place in the exposition.

That is not the way it is done in math, where you usually make the definition of a word in a formal way, marking it as Definition, putting the word in bold or italics, and listing the attributes it must have.  I want to point out two things:

  • For the most part, that behavior is peculiar to mathematics.
  • This post is not a presentation of mathematical ideas.  

This gives me an opportunity for a commercial:  Read what we have written about definitions in References [1], [3] and [4].

References

  1. Atish Bagchi and Charles Wells, Varieties of Mathematical Prose, 1998.
  2. Reuben Hersh, What is mathematics, really? Oxford University Press, 1997
  3. Charles Wells, Handbook of Mathematical Discourse.
  4. Charles Wells, Mathematical objects in abstractmath.org
  5. Math and modules of the mind (previous post)
  6. Mathematical Concepts (previous post)
  7. Thinking about abstract math (previous post)
  8. Terrence W. Deacon, Incomplete Nature.  W. W. Norton, 2012. [I have read only a little of this book so far, but I think he is talking about abstract objects in the sense I have described above.]
  9. Gideon Rosen, Abstract Objects.  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  10. Representations II: Dry Bones (previous post)

 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/

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Turning definitions into mathematical objects

When G&G was moved to this current location, most of the links were trashed, so I have been repairing them a bit at a time. There are still some broken links from 2009 and before but I am working on them.  Honest.

G&G contained a series of posts about turning definitions into mathematical objects, mostly written in 2009. Not only were their links broken (and they used many links to each other), but two of the articles were trashed.  I have now removed them from this website. They are all still at the old website: http://sixwingedseraph.wordpress.com/ and as far as I know all the links to each other work.

When I have time I will combine them into one long article.  Until then, the old website will remain.

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Showing categorical diagrams in 3D

The interactive examples in this post require installing Wolfram CDF player, which is free and works on most desktop computers using Firefox, Safari and Internet Explorer, but not Chrome. The source code is the Mathematica Notebook algebra1.nb, which is available for free use under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License. The notebook can be read by CDF Player if you cannot make the embedded versions in this post work.

In Graph-Based Logic and Sketches, Atish Bagchi and I needed to construct a lot of cones based on fairly complicated diagrams. We generally show the base diagram and left the reader to imagine the cone. This post is an experiment in presenting such a diagram in 3D, with its cone and other constructions based on it.

To understand this post, you need a basic understanding of categories, functors and limit cones (see References).

The notebook and CDF files that generate this display may be downloaded from here:

These files may be used and modified as you wish according to the Creative Commons rule listed under “Permissions” (at the top of the window).

The sketch for categories: composition

A finite-limit sketch (FL sketch) is a category with finite limits given by specifying certain  nodes and arrows, commutative diagrams using these nodes and arrows, and limit cones based on diagrams using the given nodes and arrows.  A model of an FL sketch is a finite-limit-preserving functor from the FL sketch into some category \mathcal{C}.  Detailed descriptions of FL-sketches are  in References [1], [2] and [3] (below).

Categories themselves may be sketched by FL-sketches. Here I will present the part of the sketch that constructs (in a model) the object of composites of two arrows.  This is the specification for composite:

  1. The composite of two arrows f:A\to B and g:B'\to C is defined if and only if B=B'.
  2. The composite is denoted by gf.
  3. The domain of gf is A and the codomain is C.

We start with a diagram in the FL sketch for categories that gives the data corresponding to two arrows that may be composed.  This diagram involves nodes ob and ar, which in a model become the object of objects and the object of arrows of the category object in \mathcal{C}.  (Suppose \mathcal{C} is the category of sets; then the model is simply a small category.  The node ob goes to the set of objects of the small category and ar goes to the set of arrows.)  The arrows labeled dom and cod take (in a model) an arrow to its domain and codomain respectively. Here is the diagram:

You can move the diagram around in three dimensions to see it from different perspectives. (Of course it isn’t really in three dimensions. Your eyes-to-brain module reconstructs the illusion of three dimensions when you twirl the diagram around.)

Note that this is a diagram, not a directed graph (digraph). (In the paper, Atish and I, like most category theorists, say “graph” instead of “digraph”.) It has an underlying digraph (see Chapter 2 of Graph-Based Logic and Sketches), but the labeling of several different nodes of the underlying digraph by the name of the same node of the sketch is meaningful. 

Here, the key fact is that in the diagram there are two arrows, one labeled dom and the other cod, to the same node labeled ob, and two other arrows to two different nodes labeled ob. 

Now click c1.

This shows a cone over the diagram.  One of the nodes in the sketch must be cp (in other words given beforehand; that is, we are specifying not only that the blue stuff is a limit cone but that the limit is the node cp.)   In a model, this cone must become a limit cone.  It follows from the properties of limits that the elements of cp in the model in Sets are pairs of arrows with the property that one has a codomain that is the same as the domain of the other.  The label “cp” stands for “compatible pairs”.

Now click c2.

The green stuff is a diagram showing two arrows from the node labeled ar to the left and right nodes labeled ob in the original black diagram.  This is not a cone; it is just a diagram.  In a model, any arrow in the vertex must have domain the same as the domain of one of the arrows in the compatible pair, and codomain the same as the codomain of the other arrow of the pair.  Thus in the model, an arrow living in the set labeled with “ar” in green must satisfy requirement 3 in the specification for composition given above.

Note that the requirement that the green diagram be commutative in a model is vacuous, so it doesn’t matter whether we specify it specifically as a diagram in the sketch or not.

Now click c3.

The arrow labeled comp must be specified as an arrow in the sketch.  We want its value to be the composite of an element of cp in a model, in other words a compatible pair of arrows.  At this point that will not necessarily be true.  But all can be saved:

Now click c4.

We must specify that the diagram given by the thick arrows must be a diagram of the sketch.  The fact that it must become commutative in a model means exactly that the red arrow comp from cp to ar takes a compatible pair to an arrow that satisfies requirements 1–3 of the specification of composite shown above.

References

  1. Peter T. Johnstone, Sketches of an Elephant: A Topos Theory Compendium, Volume 2 (Oxford Logic Guides 44), by Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0198524960.
  2. Michael Barr and Charles Wells, Category theory for computing science (1999).    (This is the easiest to start with but it doesn’t get very far.)
  3. Michael Barr and Charles Wells, Toposes, Triples and Theories (2005).  Reprints in Theory and Applications of Categories 1.

 
\mathcal{C}

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