Category Archives: understanding math

Modules for mathematical objects

Notes on viewing.

A recent article in Scientific American mentions discusses the idea that concepts are represented in the brain by clumps of neurons.  Other neuroscientists have proposed that each concept is distributed among millions of neurons, or that each concept corresponds to one neuron.  

I have written many posts about the idea that:  

  • Each mathematical concept is embodied in some kind of module in the brain.
  • This idea is a useful metaphor for understanding how we think about mathematical objects.
  • You don't have to know the details of the method of storage for this metaphor to be useful.  
  • The metaphor clears up a number of paradoxes and conundrums that have agitated philosophers of math.

The SA article inspired me to write about just how such a module may work in some specific cases.  

Integers

Mathematicians normally thinks of a particular integer, say $42$, as some kind of abstract object, and the decimal representation "42" as a representation of the integer, along with XLII and 2A$_{16}$.  You can visualize the physical process like this: 

  • The mathematician has a module Int (clump of neurons or whatever) that represents integers, and a module FT that represents the particular integer $42$. 
  • There is some kind of asymmetric three-way connection from FT to Int and a module EO (for "element of" or "IS_A"). 
  • That the connection is "asymmetric" means that the three modules play different roles in the connection, meaning something like "$42$ IS_A Integer"
  • The connection is a physical connection, not a sentence, and when  FT is alerted ("fired"?), Int and EO are both alerted as well. 
  • That means that if someone asks the mathematician, "Is $42$ an integer?", they answer immediately without having to think about it — it is a random access concept like (for many people) knowing that September has 30 days.
  • The module for $42$ has many other connections to other modules in the brain, and these connections vary among mathematicians.

The preceding description gives no details about how the modules and interconnections are physically processed.  Neuroscientists probably would have lots of ideas about this (with no doubt considerable variation) and would criticize what I wrote as misrepresenting the physical details in some ways.  But the physical details are their job, not mine.  What I claim is that this way of thinking makes it plausible to view abstract objects and their properties and relationships as physical objects in the brain.  You don't have to know the details any more than you have to know the details of how a rainbow works to see it (but you know that a rainbow is a physical phenomenon).

This way of thinking provides a metaphor for thinking about math objects, a metaphor that is plausibly related to what happens in the real world.

Students

A student may have a rather different representation of $42$ in the brain.  For one thing, their module for $42$ may not distinguish the symbol "42" from the number $42$, which is an abstract object.   As a result they ask questions such as, "Is $42$ composite in hexadecimal?"  This phenomenon reveals a complicated situation. 

  • People think they are talking about the same thing when in fact their internal modules for that thing may be very differently connected to other concepts in their brain.
  • Mathematicians generally share many more similarities in their modules for $42$ than people in general do.  When they differ, the differences may be of the sort that one of them is a number theorist, so knows more about $42$ (for example, that it is a Catalan number) than another mathematician does.  Or has read The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy.
  • Mathematicians also share a stance that there are right and wrong beliefs about mathematical objects, and that there is a received method for distinguishing correct from erroneous statements about a particular kind of object. (I am not saying the method always gives an answer!).
  • Of course, this stance constitutes a module in the brain. 
  • Some philosophers of education believe that this stance is erroneous, that the truth or falsity of statements are merely a matter of social acceptance.
  • In fact, the statements in purple are true of nearly all mathematicians.  
  • The fact that the truth or falsity of statements is merely a matter of social acceptance is also true, but the word "merely" is misleading.
  • The fact is that overwhelming evidence provided by experience shows that the "received method" (proof) for determining the truth of math statements works well and can be depended on. Teachers need to convince their students of this by examples rather that imposing the received method as an authority figure.

Real numbers

A mathematician thinks of a real number as having a decimal representation.

  • The representation is an infinitely long list of decimal digits, together with a location for the decimal point. (Ignoring conventions about infinite strings of zeroes.)
  • There is a metaphor that you can go along the list from left to right and when you do you get a better approximation of the "value" of the real number. (The "value" is typically thought of in terms of the metaphor of a point on the real line.)
  • Mathematicians nevertheless think of the entries in the decimal expansion of a real number as already in existence, even though you may not be able to say what they all are.
  • There is no contradiction between the points of view expressed in the last two bullets.
  • Students frequently do not believe that the decimal entries are "already there".  As a result they may argue fiercely that $.999\ldots$ cannot possibly be the same number as $1$.  (The Wikipedia article on this topic has to be one of the most thoroughly reworked math articles in the encyclopedia.)

All these facts correspond to modules in mathematicians' and students' brains.  There are modules for real number, metaphor, infinite list, decimal digit, decimal expansion, and so on.  This does not mean that the module has a separate link to each one of the digits in the decimal expansion.  The idea that there is an entry at every one of the infinite number of locations is itself a module, and no one has ever discovered a contradiction resulting from holding that belief.

References

  • Brain cells for Grandmother, by Rodrigo Quian Quiroga, Itzhak Fried and Christof Koch.  Scientific American, February 2013, pages 31ff.

Gyre&Gimble posts on modules

Notes on Viewing  

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Abstracting algebra

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Shared mental objects

Notes on viewing

Shared mental objects

I propose the phrase "shared mental object" to name the sort of thing that includes mathematical objects, abstract objects, fictional objects and other concepts with the following properties: ​

  • They are not physical objects
  • We think of them as objects 
  • We share them with other people

It is the name "shared mental object" that is a new idea; the concept has been around in philosophy and math ed for awhile and has been called various things, especially "abstract object", which is the name I have used in abstractmath.

I will go into detail concerning some examples in order to make the concept clear.  If you examine this concept deeply you discover many fine points, nested ideas and circles of examples that go back on themselves.  I will not get very far into these fine points here, but I have written about some of them posts and in abmath (see references).  I am working on a post about some of the fine points and will publish it if I can control its tendency to expand into infinite proliferation and recursion.

Examples

 

Messages

There is a story about the early days of telegraphy:  A man comes into the newly-opened telegraph station and asks to send a telegram to his son who is working in another city. He writes out the message and gives it to the operator with his payment.  The operator puts the message on a spike and clicks the key in front of him for a while, then says, "I have sent your message.  Thanks for shopping at Postal Telegraph".  The man looks astonished and points at the message and says, "But it is still here!"

A message is a shared mental object.  

  • It may be represented by a physical object, such as a piece of paper with writing on it, and people commonly refer to the paper as the message.  
  • It may be a verbal message from you, perhaps delivered by another person to a third person by speech.  
  • The delivery process may introduce errors (so can sending a telegraph).  So the thoughts in the three brains (the sender, the deliverer and the recipient) can differ from each other, but they can still talk about "the message" as if it were one object.

Other examples that are similar in nature to messages are schedules and the month of September (see Math Objects in abmath, where they are called abstract objects.).  In English-speaking communities, September is a cultural default: you are expected to know what it is. You can know that September is a month and that right this minute it is not September (unless it is September). You may think that September has 31 days and most people would say you are wrong, but they would agree that you and they are talking about the same month.

The general concept of the month of September and facts concerning it have been in shared existence in English-speaking cultural groups for (maybe) a thousand years.  In contrast, a message is usually shared by only two or three people and it has a short life; a few years from now, it may be that none of the people involved with the message remember what it said or even that it existed.

Symbols

symbol, such as the letter "a" or the integral sign "$\int$", is a shared mental object.  Like the month of September, but unlike messages, letters are shared by large cultural entities, every language community that uses the Latin alphabet (and more) in the case of "a", and math and tech people in the case of "$\int$". 

The letter "a" is represented physically on paper, a blackboard or a screen, among other things.  If you are literate in English and recognize an occurrence as representing the letter, you probably do this using a process in the brain that is automatic and that operates outside your awareness

Literate readers of English also generally agree that a string of letters either does or does not represent the word "default" but there are borderline cases (as in those little boxes where you have to prove you are not a robot) where they may disagree or admit that they don't know.  Even so, the letter "a" and the word "default" are shared in the minds of many people and there is general (but not absolutely universal) agreement on when you are seeing representations of them.

Fictional objects

Fictional objects such as Sherlock Holmes and unicorns are shared mental objects.  I wrote briefly about them in Mathematical objects and will not go into them here.  

Mathematical objects 

The integer $111$, the integral $\int_0^1 x^2\,dx$ and the set of all real numbers are all mathematical objects.   They are all shared mental objects.  In most of the world, people with a little education will know that $111$ is a number and what it means to have $111$ beans in a jar (for example).  They know that it is one more that $110$ and a lot more than $42$.  

Mathematicians, scientists and STEM students will know something about what  $\int_0^1 x^2\,dx$ means and they will probably know how to calculate it.  Most  of them may be able to do it in their head.  I have taught calculus so many times that I know it "by heart", which means that it is associated in my brain with the number $1/3$ in such a way that when I see the integral the number automatically and without effort pops us (in the same way that I know September has 30 days).

Beginning calculus students may have a confused and incorrect understanding of the set of all real numbers in several ways, but practicing mathematicians (and many others) know that it is an uncountably infinite dense set and they think of it as an object.  A student very likely does not think of it as an object, but as a sprawling unimaginable space that you cannot possibly regard as a thing. Students may picture a real number as having another real number sitting right beside it — the next biggest one. Most practicing mathematicians think of the set of real numbers as a completed infinity — every real number is already there —  and they know that between any two of them there is another one.

As a consequence, when students and professors talk about real numbers the student finds that some times the professor says things that sound completely wrong and the professor hears the student say things that are bizarre and confused.  They firmly believe they are talking about the same thing, the real numbers, but the student is seen by the professor as wrong and the professor is seen by the students as talking meaningless nonsense.  Even so, they believe they are talking about the same thing.

Nomenclature

I tried various other names before I came to "shared mental objects".

  • I called them abstract objects in abstractmath.  The word "abstract" does not convey their actual character — they are mental and they are shared.
  • They are non-physical objects, a phrase widely used in philosophy, but naming something by a negation is always a bad idea.  
  • Co-mental objects is ugly and comental looks like a misspelling.
  • Intermental objects sounds like it has something to do with burial.  Maybe InterMental?
  • The word entity may avoid some confusion caused by the word "object", which suggests physical object.  But "object" is widely used in philosophy and in math ed in the way it is used here.
  • Meme?  Well, in some sense a shared mental object is a meme.  Memes have a connotation of forcing themselves into your brain that I don't want, but I want to consider the relationship further.

The major advantage of "shared mental object" is that it describes the important properties of the concept: It is a mental object and it is shared by people.  It has no philosophical implications concerning platonism, either. Mathematical objects do have special properties of verifiability that general shared mental objects do not, but my terminology does not suggest any existence of absolute truth or of an Ideal existing in another world.  I don't believe in such things, but some people do and I want to point out that "shared mental object" does not rule such things out — it merely gives a direct evidence-based description of a phenomenon that actually exists in the real world.

References  

Abstract objects in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Abstract object in Wikipedia

Mathematical objects in abstractmath

Mathematical objects in Wikipedia

What is Mathematics, Really?  R. Hersh, Oxford University Press, 1997

Previous posts

Representations of mathematical objects 

Representations III: Rigor and Rigor Mortis

Representations II: Dry Bones

Notes on Viewing  

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Representations of mathematical objects

This is a long post. Notes on viewing.

About this post

A mathematical object, or a type of math object, is represented in practice in a great variety of ways, including some that mathematicians rarely think of as "representations".  

In this post you will find examples and comments about many different types of representations as well as references to the literature. I am not aware that anyone has considered all these different ideas of representation in one place before. Reading through this post should raise your consciousness about what is going on when you do math.  

This is also an experiment in exposition.  The examples are discussed in a style similar to the way a Mathematica command is discussed in the Documentation Center, using mostly nonhierarchical bulleted lists. I find it easy to discover what I want to know when it is written in that way.  (What is hard is discovering the name of a command that will do what I want.)

Types of representations

Using language

  • Language can be used to define a type of object.
  • A definition is intended to be precise enough to determine all the properties that objects of that type all have.  (Pay attention to the two uses of the word "all" in that sentence; they are both significant, in very different ways.)
  • Language can be used to describe an object, exhibiting properties without determining all properties.
  • It can also provide metaphors, making use of one of the basic tools of our brain to understand the world. 
  • The language used is most commonly mathematical English, a special dialect of English.
  • The symbolic language of mathematics (distinct from mathematical English) is used widely in calculations. Phrases from the symbolic language are often embedded in a statement in math English. The symbolic language includes among others algebraic notation and logical notation. 
  • The language may also be a formal language, a language that is mathematically defined and is thus itself a mathematical object. Logic texts generally present the first order predicate calculus as a formal language. 
  • Neither mathematical English nor the symbolic language is a formal language. Both allow irregularities and ambiguities.

Mathematical objects

The representation itself may be a mathematical object, such as:

  • A linear representation of a group. Not only are the groups mathematical objects, so is the representation.
  • An embedding of a manifold into Euclidean space. A definition given in a formal language of the first order predicate calculus of the property of commutativity of binary operations. (Thus a property can be represented as a math object.)

Visual representations

A math object can be represented visually using a physical object such as a picture, graph (in several senses), or diagram.  

  • The visual processing of our brain is our major source of knowledge of the world and takes about a fifth of the brain's processing power.  We can learn many things using our vision that would take much longer to learn using verbal descriptions.  (Proofs are a different matter.)
  • When you look at a graph (for example) your brain creates a mental representation of the graph (see below).

Mental representations

If you are a mathematician, a math object such as "$42$", "the real numbers" or "continuity" has a mental representation in your brain.  

  • In the math ed literature, such a representation is called "mental image", "concept image", "procept", or "schema".   (The word "image" in these names is not thought of as necessarily visual.) 
  • The procept or schema describe all the things that come to mind when you think about a particular math object: The definition, important theorems, visual images, important examples, and various metaphors that help you understand it. 
  • The visual images occuring in a mental schema for an object may themselves be mental representations of physical objects. The examples and theorems may be mental representations of ideas you learned from language or pictures, and so on.  The relationships between different kinds of representations get quite convoluted.

Metaphors

Conceptual metaphors are a particular kind of mental representation of an object which involve mentally associating some aspects of the objects with some aspects of something else — a physical object, an image, an action or another abstract object.

  • A conceptual metaphor may give you new insight into the object.
  • It may also mislead you because you think of properties of the other object that the math object doesn't have.
  • A graph of a function is a conceptual metaphor.
  • When you say that a point on a graph "rises as it goes from left to right" your metaphor is an action. 
  • When you say that the cosets of a normal subgroup of a group "get along" with the group multiplication, your metaphor identifies a property they have with an aspect of human behavior.

Properties of representations

A representation of a math object may or may not

  • determine it completely
  • exhibit some of its properties
  • suggest easy proofs of some theorems
  • provide a useful way of thinking about it
  • mislead you about the object's properties
  • mislead you about what is significant about the object

Examples of representations

This list shows many of the possibilities of representation.  In each case I discuss the example in terms of the two bulleted lists above. Some of the examples are reused from my previous publications.

Functions

Example (F1) "Let $f(x)$ be the function defined by $f(x)=x^3-x$."

  • This is an expression in mathematical English that a fluent reader of mathematical English will recognize gives a definition of a specific function.
  • (F1) is therefore a representation of that function.  
  • The word "representation" is not usually used in this way in math.  My intention is that it should be recognized as the same kind of object as many other representations.
  • The expression contains the formula $x^3-x$.  This is an encapsulated computation in the symbolic language of math. It allows someone who knows basic algebra and calculus to perform calculations that find the roots, extrema and inflection points of the function $f$.  
  • The word "let" suggests to the fluent reader of mathematical English that (F1) is a definition which is probably going to hold for the next chunk of text, but probably not for the whole article or book.
  • Statements in mathematical English are generally subject to conventions.  In a calculus text (F1) would automatically mean that the function had the real numbers as domain and codomain.
  • The last two remarks show that a beginner has to learn to read mathematical English. 
  • Another convention is discussed in the following diatribe.

Diatribe 

You would expect $f(x)$ by itself to mean the value of $f$ at $x$, but in (F1) the $x$ has the property of a bound variable.  In mathematical English, "let" binds variables. However, after the definition, in the text the "$x$" in the expression "$f(x)$" will be free, but the $f$ will be bound to the specific meaning.  It is reasonable to say that the term "$f(x)$" represents the expression "$x^3-x$" and that $f$ is the (temporary) name of the function. Nevertheless, it is very common to say "the function $f(x)$" to mean $f$.  

A fluent reader of mathematical English knows all this, but probably no one has ever said it explicitly to them.  Mathematical English and the symbolic language should be taught explicitly, including its peculiarities such as "the function $f(x)$".  (You may want to deprecate this usage when you teach it, but students deserve to understand its meaning.)

The positive integers

You have a mental representation of the positive integers $1,2,3,\ldots$.  In this discussion I will assume that "you" know a certain amount of math.  Non-mathematicians may have very different mental representations of the integers.

  • You have a concept of "an integer" in some operational way as an abstract object.
  • "Abstract object" needs a post of its own. Meanwhile see Mathematical Objects (abstractmath) and the Wikipedia articles on Mathematical objects and Abstract objects.
  • You have a connection in your brain between the concept of integer and the concept of listing things in order, numbering them by $1,2,3,\ldots$.
  • You have a connection in your brain between the concept of an integer and the concept of counting a finite number of objects.  But then you need zero!
  • You understand how to represent an integer using the decimal representation, and perhaps representations to other bases as well. 
  • Your mental image has the integer "$42"$ connected to but not the same as the decimal representation "42". This is not true of many students.
  • The decimal rep has a picture of the string "42" associated to it, and of course the picture of the string may come up when you think of the integer $42$ as well (it does for me — it is a an icon for the number $42$.)
  • You have a concept of the set of integers. 
  • Students need to be told that by convention "the set of integers" means the set of all integers.  This particularly applies to students whose native language does not have articles, but American students have trouble with this, too.
  • Your concept of  "the set of integers" may have the icon "$\mathbb{N}$" associated with it.  If you are a mathematician, the icon and the concept of the set of integers are associated with each other but not identified with each other.
  • For me, at least, the concept "set of integers" is mentally connected to each integer by the "element of" relation. (See third bullet below.)
  • You have a mental representation of the fact that the set of integers is infinite.  
  • This does not mean that your brain contains an infinite number of objects, but that you have a representation of infinity as a concept, it is brain-connected to the concept of the set of integers, and also perhaps to a proof of the fact that $\mathbb{N}$ is infinite.
  • In particular, the idea that the set of integers is mentally connected to each integer does not mean that the whole infinite number of integers is attached in your brain to the concept of the set of integers.  Rather, the idea is a predicate in your brain.  When it is connected to "$42$", it says "yes".  To "$\pi$" it says "No".
  • Philosophers worry about the concept of completed infinity.  It exists as a concept in your brain that interacts as a meme with concepts in other mathematicians' brains. In that way, and in that way only (as far as I am concerned) it is a physical object, in particular an object that exists in scattered physical form in a social network.

Graph of a function

This is a graph of the function $y=x^3-x$:

Graph of a cubic function

  • The graph is a physical object, either on a screen or on paper
  • It is processed by your visual system, the most powerful sensory management system in your brain
  • It also represents the graph in the mathematical sense (set of ordered pairs) of the function $y=x^3-x$
  • Both the mathematical graph and the physical graph are represented by modules in your brain, which associates the two of them with each other by a conceptual metaphor
  • The graph shows some properties of the function: inflection point, going off to infinity in a specific way, and so on.
  • These properties are made apparent (if you are knowledgeable) by means of the powerful pattern recognition system in your brain. You see them much more quickly than you can discover them by calculation.
  • These properties are not proved by the graph. Nevertheless, the graph communicates information: for example, it suggests that you can prove that there is an inflection point near $(0,0)$.
  • The graph does not determine or define the function: It is inaccurate and it does not (cannot) show all of the graph.
  • More subtle details about this graph are discussed in my post Representations 2.

Continuity

Example (C1) The $\epsilon-\delta$ definition of the continuity of a function $f:\mathbb{R}\to\mathbb{R}$ may be given in the symbolic language of math:

A function $f$ is continuous at a number $c$ if \[\forall\epsilon(\epsilon\gt0\implies(\forall x(\exists\delta(|x-c|\lt\delta\implies|f(x)-f(c)|\lt\epsilon)))\]

  • To understand (C1), you must be familiar with the notation of first order logic.  For most students, getting the notation right is quite a bit of work.  
  • You must also understand  the concepts, rules and semantics of first order logic.  
  • Even if you are familiar with all that, continuity is still a difficult concept to understand.
  • This statement does show that the concept is logically complicated. I don't see how it gives any other intuition about the concept. 

Example (C2) The definition of continuity can also be represented in mathematical English like this:

A function $f$ is continuous at a number $c$ if for any $\epsilon\gt0$ and for any $x$ there is a $\delta$ such that if $|x-c|\lt\delta$, then $|f(x)-f(c)|\lt\epsilon$. 

  • This definition doesn't give any more intuition that (C1) does.
  • It is easier to read that (C1) for most math students, but it still requires intimate familiarity with the quirks of math English.
  • The fact that "continuous" is in boldface signals that this is a definition.  This is a convention.
  • The phrase "For any $\epsilon\gt0$" contains an unmarked parenthetic insertion that makes it grammatically incoherent.  It could be translated as: "For any $\epsilon$ that is greater than $0$".  Most math majors eventually understand such things subconsciously.  This usage is very common.
  • Unless it is explicitly pointed out, most students won't notice that  if you change the phrase "for any $x$ there is a $\delta$"  to "there is a $\delta$ for any $x$" the result means something quite different.  Cauchy never caught onto this.
  • In both (C1) and (C2), the "if" in the phrase "A function $f$ is continuous at a number $c$ if…" means "if and only if" because it is in a definition.  Students rarely see this pointed out explicitly.  

Example (C3) The definition of continuity can be given in a formally defined first order logical theory

  • The theory would have to contain function symbols and axioms expressing the algebra of real numbers as an ordered field. 
  • I don't know that such a definition has ever been given, but there are various semi-automated and automated theorem-proving systems (which I know little about) that might be able to state such a definition.  I would appreciate information about this.
  • Such a definition would make the property of continuity a mathematical object.
  • An automated theorem-proving system might be able to prove that $x^3-x$ is continuous, but I wonder if the resulting proof would aid your intuition much.

Example (C4) A function from one topological space to another is continuous if the inverse of every open set in the codomain is an open set in the domain.

  • This definition is stated in mathematical English.
  • All definitions start with primitive data. 
  • In definitions (C1) – (C3), the primitive data are real numbers and the statement uses properties of an ordered field.
  • In (C4), the data are real numbers and the arithmetic operations of a topological field, along with the open sets of the field. The ordering is not mentioned.
  • This shows that a definition need not mention some important aspects of the structure. 
  • One marvelous example of this is that  a partition of a set and an equivalence relation on a set are based on essentially disjoint sets of data, but they define exactly the same type of structure.

Example (C4) "The graph of a continuous function can be drawn without picking up the chalk".

  • This is a metaphor that associates an action with the graph.
  • It is incorrect: The graphs of some continuous functions cannot be drawn.  For example, the function $x\mapsto x^2\sin(1/x)$ is continuous on the interval $[-1,1]$ but cannot be drawn at $x=0$. 
  • Generally speaking, if the function can be drawn then it can be drawn without picking up the chalk, so the metaphor provides a useful insight, and it provides an entry into consciousness-raising examples like the one in the preceding bullet.

References

  1. 1.000… and .999… (post)
  2. Conceptual blending (post)
  3. Conceptual blending (Wikipedia)
  4. Conceptual metaphors (Wikipedia)
  5. Convention (abstractmath)
  6. Definitions (abstractmath)
  7. Embodied cognition (Wikipedia)
  8. Handbook of mathematical discourse (see articles on conceptual blendmental representationrepresentationmetaphor, parenthetic assertion)
  9. Images and Metaphors (abstractmath).
  10. The interplay of text, symbols and graphics in math education, Lin Hammill
  11. Math and the modules of the mind (post)
  12. Mathematical discourse: Language, symbolism and visual images, K. L. O’Halloran.
  13. Mathematical objects (abmath)
  14. Mathematical objects (Wikipedia)
  15. Mathematical objects are “out there?” (post)
  16. Metaphors in computing science ​(post)
  17. Procept (Wikipedia)
  18. Representations 2 (post)     
  19. Representations and models (abstractmath)
  20. Representations II: dry bones (post)
  21. Representation theorems (Wikipedia) Concrete representations of abstractly defined objects.
  22. Representation theory (Wikipedia) Linear representations of algebraic structures.
  23. Semiotics, symbols and mathematical visualization, Norma Presmeg, 2006.
  24. The transition to formal thinking in mathematics, David Tall, 2010
  25. Theory in mathematical logic (Wikipedia)
  26. What is the object of the encapsulation of a process? Tall et al., 2000.
  27. Where mathematics comes from, by George Lakoff and Rafael Núñez, Basic Books, 2000. 
  28. Where mathematics comes from (Wikipedia) This is a review of the preceding book.  It is a permanent link to the version of 04:23, 25 October 2012.  The review is opinionated, partly wrong, not well written and does not fit the requirements of a Wikipedia entry.  I recommend it anyway; it is well worth reading.  It contains links to three other reviews.

Notes on Viewing  

This post uses MathJax. If you see mathematical expressions with dollar signs around them, or badly formatted formulas, try refreshing the screen. Sometimes you have to do it two or three times.

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Representing and thinking about sets

The interactive examples in this post require installing Wolfram CDF player, which is free and works on most desktop computers using Firefox, Safari and Internet Explorer, but not Chrome. The source code is the Mathematica Notebook Representing sets.nb, which is available for free use under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License. The notebook can be read by CDF Player if you cannot make the embedded versions in this post work.

Representations of sets

Sets are represented in the math literature in several different ways, some mentioned here.  Also mentioned are some other possibilities.  Introducing a variety of representations of any type of math object is desirable because students tend to assume that the representation is the object.

Curly bracket notation

The standard representation for a finite set is of the form "$\{1,3,5,6\}$". This particular example represents the unique set containing the integers $1$, $3$, $5$ and $6$ and nothing else. This means precisely that the statement "$n$ is an element of $S$" is true if $n=1$, $n=3$, $n=5$ or $n=6$, and it is false if $n$ represents any other mathematical object. 

In the way the notation is usually used, "$\{1,3,5,6\}$", "$\{3,1,5,6\}$", "$\{1,5,3,6\}$",  "$\{1,6,3,5,1\}$" and $\{ 6,6,3,5,1,5\}$ all represent the same set. Textbooks sometimes say "order and repetition don't matter". But that is a statement about this particular representation style for sets. It is not a statement about sets.

It would be nice to come up with a representation for sets that doesn't involve an ordering. Traditional algebraic notation is essentially one-dimensional and so automatically imposes an ordering (see Algebra is a difficult foreign language).    

Let the elements move

In Visible Algebra II, I experimented with the idea of putting the elements at random inside a circle and letting them visibly move around like goldfish in a bowl.  (That experiment was actually for multisets but it applies to sets, too.)  This is certainly a representation that does not impose an ordering, but it is also distracting.  Our visual system is attracted to movement (but not as much as a cat's visual system).  

Enforce natural ordering

One possibility would be to extend the machinery in a visible algebra system that allows you to make a box you could drag elements into. 

This box would order the elements in some canonical order (numerical order for numbers, alphabetical order for strings of letters or words) with the property that if you inserted an element in the wrong place it would rearrange itself, and if you tried to insert an element more than once the representation would not change.  What you would then have is a unique representation of the set.

An example is the device below.  (If you have Mathematica, not just CDF player, you can type in numbers as you wish instead of having to use the buttons.) 

This does not allow a representation of a heterogenous set such as $\{3,\mathbb{R},\emptyset,\left(\begin{array}{cc}1&2\\0&1\\ \end{array}\right)\}$.  So what?  You can't represent every function by a graph, either.

Hanger notation

The tree notation used in my visual algebra posts could be used for sets as well, as illustrated below. The system allows you to drag the elements listed into different positions, including all around the set node. If you had a node for lists, that would not be possible.

This representation has the pedagogical advantage of shows that a set is not its elements.

  • A set is distinct from its elements
  • A set is completely determined by what the elements are.

Pattern recognition

Infinite sets are sometimes represented using the curly bracket notation using a pattern that defines the set.  For example, the set of even integers could be represented by $\{0,2,4,6,\ldots\}$.  Such a representation is necessarily a convention, since any beginning pattern can in fact represent an infinite number of different infinite sets.  Personally, I would write, "Consider the even integers $\{0,2,4,6,\ldots\}$", but I would not write,  "Consider the set $\{0,2,4,6,\ldots\}$".

By the way, if you are writing for newbies, you should say,"Consider the set of even integers $\{0,2,4,6,\ldots\}$". The sentence "Consider the even integers $\{0,2,4,6,\ldots\}$" is unambiguous because by convention a list of numbers in curly brackets defines a set. But newbies need lots of redundancy.

Representation by a sentence

Setbuilder notation is exemplified by $\{x|x>0\}$, which denotes the positive reals, given a convention or explicit statement that $x$ represents a real number.  This allows the representation of some infinite sets without depending on a possibly ambiguous pattern. 

A Visible Algebra system needs to allow this, too. That could be (necessarily incompletely) done in this way:

  • You type in a sentence into a Setbuilder box that defines the set.
  • You then attach a box to the Setbuilder box containing a possible element.
  • The system then answers Yes, No, or Can't Tell.

The Can't Tell answer is a necessary requirement because the general question of whether an element is in a set defined by a first order sentence is undecidable. Perhaps the system could add some choices:

  • Try for a second.
  • Try for an hour.
  • Try for a year.
  • Try for the age of the universe.

Even so, I'll bet a system using Mathematica could answer many questions like this for sentences referring to a specific polynomial, using the Solve or NSolve command.  For example, the answer to the question, "Is $3\in\{n|n\lt0 \text{ and } n^2=9\}$?" (where $n$ ranges over the integers) would be "No", and the answer to  "Is $\{n|n\lt0 \text{ and } n^2=9\}$ empty?" would also be "No". [Corrected 2012.10.24]

References

  1. Explaining “higher” math to beginners (previous post)
  2. Algebra is a difficult foreign language (previous post)
  3. Visible Algebra II (previous post)
  4. Sets: Notation (abstractmath article)
  5. Setbuilder notation (Wikipedia)
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Explaining “higher” math to beginners


The interactive example in this post require installing Wolfram CDF player, which is free and works on most desktop computers using Firefox, Safari and Internet Explorer, but not Chrome. The source code is the Mathematica Notebook algebra2.nb, which is available for free use under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License. The notebook can be read by CDF Player if you cannot make the embedded versions in this post work.

Notes on viewing

Explaining math

I am in the process of writing an explanation of monads for people with not much math background.  In that article, I began to explain my ideas about exposition for readers at that level and after I had written several paragraphs decided I needed a separate article about exposition.  This is that article. It is mostly about language.

Who is it written for?

Interested laypeople

There are many recent books explaining some aspect of math for people who are not happy with high school algebra; some of them are listed in the references.  They must be smart readers who know how to concentrate, but for whom algebra and logic and definition-theorem-proof do not communicate.  They could be called interested laypeople, but that is a lousy name and I would appreciate suggestions for a better name. 

Math newbies

My post on monads is aimed at people who have some math, and who are interested in "understanding" some aspect of "higher math"; not understanding in the sense of being able to prove things about monads, but merely how to think about them.   I will call them math newbies.  Of course, I am including math majors, but I want to make it available to other people who are willing to tackle mathematical explanations and who are interested in knowing more about advanced stuff. 

These "other people" may include people (students and practitioners) in other science & technology areas as well as liberal-artsy people.  There are such people, I have met them.  I recall one theologian who asked me about what was the big deal about ruler-and-compass construction and who seemed to feel enlightened when I told him that those constructions preserve exactly the ideal nature of geometric objects.  (I later found out he was a famous theologian I had never heard of, just like Ngô Bảo Châu is a famous mathematician nonmathematicians have never heard of.)

Algebra and other foreign languages

If you are aiming at interested laypeople you absolutely must avoid algebra.  It is a foreign language that simply does not communicate to most of the educated people in the world.  Learning a foreign language is difficult. 

So how do you avoid algebra?  Well, you have to be clever and insightful.  The book by Matthew Watkins (below) has absolutely wonderful tricks for doing that, and I think anyone interested in math exposition ought to read it.  He uses metaphors, pictures and saying the same thing in different words. When you finish reading his book, you won't know how to prove statements related to the prime number theorem (unless you already knew how) but you have a good chance of understanding the statement of some theorem in that subject. See my review of the book for more details.

If your article is for math newbies, you don't have to avoid algebra completely.  But remember they are newbies and not as fluent as you are — they do things analogous to "Throw Mama from the train a kiss" and "I can haz cheeseburger?".  But if you are trying to give them some way of thinking about a concept, you need many other things (metaphors, illustrative applications, diagrams…)  You don't need the definition-theorem-proof style too common in "exposition".  (You do need that for math majors who want to become professional mathematicians.) 

Unfamiliar notation

In writing expositions for interested laypeople or math newbies, you should not introduce an unfamiliar notation system (which is like a minilanguage).  I expect to write the monad article without commutative diagrams.  Now, commutative diagrams are a wonderful invention, the best way of writing about categories, and they are widely used by other than category theorists.  But to explain monads to a newbie by introducing and then using commutative diagrams is like incorporating a short grammar of Spanish which you will then use in an explanation of Sancho Panza's relationship with Don Quixote. 

The abstractmath article on and, or and not does not use any of the several symbolic notations for logic that are in use.  The explanations simply use "and", "or" and "not".  I did introduce the notation, but didn't use it in the explanations.  When I rewrite the article I expect to put the notation at the end of the article instead of in the middle.  I expect to rewrite the other articles on mathematical reasoning to follow that practice, too.

Technical terminology

This is about the technical terminology used in math.  Technical terminology belongs to the math dialect (or register) of English, which is not a foreign language in the same sense as algebra.  One big problem is changing the meaning of ordinary English words to a technical meaning.  This requires a definition, and definitions are not something most people take seriously until they have been thoroughly brainwashed into using mathematical methodology.  Math majors have to be brainwashed in this way, but if you are writing for laypeople or newbies you cannot use the technology of formal definition.

Groups, simple groups

"You say the Monster Group is SIMPLE???  You must be a GENIUS!"  So Mark Ronan in his book (below) referred to simple groups as atoms.  Marcus du Sautoy calls them building blocks.  The mathematical meaning of "simple group" is not a transparent consequence of the meanings of "simple" and "group". Du Sautoy usually writes "group of symmetries" instead of just "group", which gives you an image of what he is talking about without having to go into the abstract definition of group. So in that usage, "group" just means "collection", which is what some students continue to think well after you give the definition.  

A better, but ugly, name for "group" might be "symmetroid". It sounds technical, but that might be an advantage, not a disadvantage. "Group" obviously means any collection, as I've known since childhood. "Symmetroid" I've never heard of so maybe I'd better find out what it means.

In beginning abstract math courses my students fervently (but subconsciously) believe that they can figure out what a word means by what it means already, never mind the "definition" which causes their eyes to glaze over. You have to be really persuasive to change their minds.

Prime factorization

Matthew Watkins referred to the prime factorization of an integer as a cluster. I am not sure why Watkins doesn't like "prime factorization", which usually refers to an expression such as  $p^{n_1}_1p^{n_2}_2\ldots p^{n_k}_k$.  This (as he says) has a spurious ordering that makes you have to worry about what the uniqueness of factorization means. The prime factorization is really a multiset of primes, where the order does not matter. 

Watkins illustrates a cluster of primes as a bunch of pingpong balls stuck together with glue, so the prime factorization of 90 would be four smushed together balls marked 2, 3, 3 and 5. Below is another way of illustrating the prime factorization of 90. Yes, the random movement programming could be improved, but Mathematica seduces you into infinite playing around and I want to finish this post. (Actually, I am beginning to think I like smushed pingpong balls better. Even better would be a smushed pingpong picture that I could click on and look at it from different angles.)

Metaphors, pictures, graphs, animation

Any exposition of math should use metaphors, pictures and graphs, especially manipulable pictures (like the one above) and graphs.  This applies to expositions for math majors as well as laypeople and newbies.  Calculus and other texts nowadays have begun doing this, more with pictures than with metaphors. 

I was turned on to these ideas as far back as 1967 (date not certain) when I found an early version of David Mumford's "Red Book", which I think evolved into the book The Red Book of Varieties and Schemes.  The early version was a revelation to me both about schemes and about exposition. I have lost the early book and only looked at the published version briefly when it appeared (1999).  I remember (not necessarily correctly) that he illustrated the spectrum as a graph whose coordinates were primes, and generic points were smudges.  Writing this post has motivated me to go to the University of Minnesota math library and look at the published version again.

References

Expositions for educated non-mathematicians

Previous posts in G&G

Relevant abmath articles

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Visible algebra II

The interactive examples in this post require installing Wolfram CDF player, which is free and works on most desktop computers using Firefox, Safari and Internet Explorer, but not Chrome. The source code is the Mathematica Notebook Wolfram website. The code for the demos is in the Mathematica notebook algebra2.nb, which is available for free use under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License. The notebook can be read by CDF Player if you cannot make the embedded versions in this post work.

More about visible algebra

I have written about visible algebra in previous posts (see References). My ideas about the interface are constantly changing. Some new ideas are described here.

In the first place I want to make it clear that what I am showing in these posts is a simulation of a possible visual algebra system.  I have not constructed any part of the system; these posts only show something about what the interface will look like.  My practice in the last few years is to throw out ideas, not construct completed documents or programs.  (I am not saying how long I will continue to do this.)  All these posts, Mathematica programs and abstractmath.org are available to reuse under a Creative Commons license.

Commutative and associative operations

Times and Plus are commutative and associative operations.  They are usually defined as binary operations.  A binary operation $*$ is said to be commutative if for all $x$ and $y$ in the underlying set of the operation, $x*y=y*x$, and it is associative if for all $x$,$y$ and $z$ in the underlying set of the operation, $(x*y)*z=x*(y*z)$. 

It is far better to define a commutative and associative operation $*$ on some underlying set $S$ as an operation on any multiset of elements of $S$.  A multiset is like a set, in particular elements can be rearranged in any way, but it is not like a set in that elements can be repeated and a different number of repetitions of an element makes a different multiset.  So for any particular multiset, the number of repetitions of each element is fixed.  Thus $\{a,a,b,b,c\} = \{c,b,a,b,a\}$ but $\{a,a,b,b,c\}\neq\{c,b,a,b,c\}$. This means that the function (operation) Plus, for example, is defined on any multiset of numbers, and \[\mathbf{Plus}\{a,a,b,b,c\}=\mathbf{Plus} \{c,b,a,b,a\}\] but $\mathbf{Plus}\{a,a,b,b,c\}$ might not be equal to $\mathbf{Plus} \{c,b,a,b,c\}$.

This way of defining (any) associative and commutative operation comes from the theory of monads.  An operation defined on all the multisets drawn from a particular set is necessarily commutative and associative if it satisfies some basic monad identities, the main one being it commutes with union of multisets (which is defined in the way you would expect, and if this irritates you, read the Wikipedia article on multisets.). You don't have to impose any conditions specifically referring to commutativity or associativity.  I expect to write further about monads in a later post. 

The input process for a visible algebra system should allow the full strength of this fact. You can attach as many inputs as you want to Times or Plus and you can move them around.  For example, you can click on any input and move it to a different place in the following demo.

Other input notations might be suitable for different purposes.  The example below shows how the inputs can be placed randomly in two dimensions (but preserving multiplicity).  I experimented with making it show the variables slowly moving around inside the circle the way the fish do in that screensaver (which mesmerizes small children, by the way — never mind what it does to me), but I haven't yet made it work.

A visible algebra system might well allow directly input tables to be added up (or multiplied), like the one below. Spreadsheets have such an operation In particular, the spreadsheet operation does not insist that you apply it only as a binary operation to columns with two entries.  By far the most natural way to define addition of numbers is as an operation on multisets of numbers.

Other operations

Operations that are associative but not commutative, such as matrix multiplication, can be defined the monad way as operations on finite lists (or tuples or vectors) of numbers.  The operation is automatically associative if you require it to preserve concatenation of lists and some other monad requirements.

Some binary operations are neither commutative nor associative.  Two such operations on numbers are Subtract and Power.  Such operations are truly binary operations; there is no obvious way to apply them to other structures.  They are only binary because the two inputs have different roles.  This suggests that the inputs be given names, as in the examples below.

Later, I will write more about simplifying trees, solving the max area problem for rectangles surmounted by semicircles, and other things concerning this system of doing algebra.

References

Previous posts about visible algebra

Other references

 

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Visible algebra I supplement

The interactive examples in this post require installing Wolfram CDF player, which is free and works on most desktop computers using Firefox, Safari and Internet Explorer, but not Chrome. The source code is the Mathematica Notebook algebra1.nb, which is available for free use under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License. The notebook can be read by CDF Player if you cannot make the embedded versions in this post work.

Active calculation of area

In my previous post Visible algebra I constructed a computation tree for calculating the area of a window consisting of a rectangle surmounted by a semicircle. The visual algebra system described there constructs a computation by selecting operations and attaching them to a tree, which can then be used to calculate the area of the window. 

I promised to produce a live computation tree later; it is below.

Press the buttons from left to right to simulate the computation that would take place in a genuine algebra system.  Note that if you skip button 2 you get the effect of parallel computation (the only place in the calculation that can be parallelized).

In Visual Algebra I the tree was put together step by step by reasoning out how you would calculate the area of the window: (1) the area is the sum of the areas of the semidisk and the rectangle, (2) the rectangle is width times height, (3) the semidisk has half the area of a disk of radius half the width of the rectangle, and so on.  So the resulting tree is a transparent construction that lets you see the reasoning that created it.  

The resulting tree could obviously be simplified.  But if you were designing a few such windows, why should you simplify it?  You certainly don't need to simplify it to speed up the computation.  On the other hand, if you are going on to solve the problem of finding the maximum area you can get if the perimeter is fixed, you will have to do some algebraic manipulation and so you do want a simplified expression.    

Later, I will write more about simplifying trees, solving the max area problem, and other things concerning this system of doing algebra.

Remark

What I am showing in these posts is a simulation of a possible visible algebra system.  I have not constructed any part of the system; these posts only show something about what the interface will look like.  My practice in the last few years is to throw out ideas, not construct completed documents or programs.  (I am not saying how long I will continue to do this.)  All these posts, Mathematica programs and abstractmath.org are available to reuse under a Creative Commons license.

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1.000… and 0.999…

 

Note: This post uses MathJax. If you see mathematical formulas with dollar signs around them, or badly formatted formulas, try refreshing the screen. Sometimes you have to do it two or three times.
 
Recently Julian Wilson sent me this letter:
It is well known that students often have trouble accepting that $0.999\ldots$ is the same number as $1.000\ldots$.  However, there is at least one context in which these could be regarded as in some sense as being distinct. In a discrete dynamical system where the next iterate is formed by multiplying the current value by 10 and dropping the leading digit, and where you make a note at each iteration of the first digit after the decimal point, then 0.9999… generates a sequence of 9s, whereas 1.0000… generates a sequence of 0s. The imagery is of a stretching a circle, wrapping it ten times around itself and recording in which sector (labeled 0 to 9) you end up.
 
From the dynamical systems perspective, being in state 9 (and remaining there after each iteration) is different from being in state 0.
The $0.9999\ldots =1.0000\ldots$ equation is associated with several conceptual difficulties that math students have, which I will describe here.

The decimal representation is not the number

Another way of describing the equation is to say that "$0.999\ldots$" and "$1.000\ldots$" are distinct decimal representations of the same number, namely $1$. Julian's proposal provides a different interpretation of the notation, in which "$0.999\ldots$" and "$1.000\ldots$" are strings of symbols generated by two different machines.  Of course, that is correct.  But they are both correct decimal notation that correspond to the same number.

Mathematical writing will sometimes use notation to mean the abstract mathematical object it refers to, and at other times the text is referring to the notation itself.  For example,

$x^2+1$ is always positive.

refers to the value of $x^2+1$, but

If you substitute $5$ for $x$ in $x^2+1$ you get $26$.

refers to the expression "$x^2+1$".  Careful authors would write,

If you substitute $5$ for $x$ in "$x^2+1$" you get $26$.

This ambiguity in using mathematical notation is an example of what philosophers call the "use-mention" distinction, but they apply the phrase to many other situations as well.  Mathematicians have an operational knowledge of this distinction but many of them are not consciously aware of it.

Definitions

A decimal representation of a number by definition represents the number that a certain power series converges to. The two power series corresponding to 1.000… and to 0.999… both converge to 1:

\[1+\sum_{i=1}^{\infty}\frac{0}{10^n}=1\]

and

\[0+\sum_{i=1}^{\infty}\frac{9}{10^n}=1\] 

They are different power series (mention) but converge (use) to the same number.

Most students new to abstract math are not aware of the importance of definition in math. As they learn more, they may still hold on to the idea that you have to discover or reason out what a math word or expression means.  In purple prose, THE DEFINITION IS A DICTATOR. 

This does not mean that you can understand the concept merely by reading the definition.  The definition usually does not mention most of the important things about the concept.

Completed Infinity

A common remark by newbies about $0.999\ldots$ is that it gets closer and closer to $1$ but does not get there. So it can't be equal to $1$.  This shows a lack of understanding of completed infinity.  The point is that the notation "$0.999\ldots$" refers to a string beginning with "$0.$" and followed by an infinite sequence of $9$'s.  Now "$s$ is an infinite sequence of $9$'s" means precisely that $s$ has an entry $s_n$ for every positive integer $n$, and that $s_n$ is $9$ for every positive integer $n$. 

  • The expression is gradually unrolling over time, and does not ever "get there". 
  • All the nines are already there.

Both the preceding sentences are metaphorical.  They are about how you should think about "$0.999\ldots$".  The first metaphor is bad, the second metaphor is good.  Neither statement is a formal mathematical statement.  Neither statement says anything about what the sequence really is.  They are not statements about reality at all, they are about how you should think about the sequence if you are going to understand what mathematicians say about it. 

Metaphors are crucial to understanding math.  Too many students use the wrong metaphors, but too often no one tells them about it.

We need a math ed text for teachers

I am thinking of precalculus through typical college math major courses.  The issues I have discussed in this post are occasionally written about in the math ed literature but I have had difficulty finding many articles (on the web and on JStor) about these specific ideas.  Anyway, articles are not what we need.  We need a modest paperback book specifically aimed at teachers, covering the kinds of cognitive difficulties math students have when faced with abstraction. 

What I have written in abstractmath.org and in the Handbook are examples of what I mean, but they don't cover all the problems and they suffer from lack of focus.  (Note that the material in abstractmath.org and in posts on this blog can be used freely under a Creative Commons license — click on "Permissions" in the blue banner at the top of this page). 

Among math ed researchers, I have learned a lot from papers by Anna Sfard and David Tall

References

 
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